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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE WELFARE AND
PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT
I. INTRODUCTION

Proposals to regulate private pension and deferred profitsharing plans1 are by no means new to Congress. With the rapid
growth in size, number and complexity of such plans in the late
1940's and early 1950's,2 Congress began to give increasingly

close attention to their defects and, particularly, to their mismanagement. The first congressional attempt to reduce the instances of private pension plan mismanagement occurred in 1958
when Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.3 The Act was amended once in 1962,4 and further
proposed amendments are presently before the Congress.
This note will examine two of the proposed amendments to the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act which were introduced
in the 91 st Congress. 5 Emphasis will be placed upon the need for
further federal regulation of private pension plans and the
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed legislation.
II.

THE PRIVATE PENSION PLAN

It is unlikely that anyone contemplating the potential growth of
1 A pension plan is a program under which either the amount of the benefit to be paid to
the employee upon retirement or the annual contribution to the employee's account (which
account, upon retirement, contains the total amount which will thereafter be paid to the
employee in lump sum or, more often, in installments) is fixed by a predetermined formula.
See D. ROTHAM, ESTABLISHING AND ADMINISTERING PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING
PLANS AND TRUST FUNDS 4

(1967).

A deferred profit-sharing plan is a program under which a certain share of the employer's annual profit is allocated to each eligible employee's account, out of which benefits will
be paid upon retirement. Id. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "private pension plan"
as 2used in this note will include deferred profit-sharing plans.
See generally P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 7-8 (1959).

Professor Harbrecht cites four reasons for the sudden and rapid growth of private pension
plans: first, since World War 11 the combination of high corporate taxes in general and the
availability of certain tax deductions for contributions to private pension plans has encouraged employees to establish such plans; second, wage stabilization programs during World
War I1 and the Korean Conflict led to increased competition among employers to attract
and hold workers with more attractive "fringe benefits," including pension plans; third, a
court decision, Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (&TH Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 960 (1949), enforcing 77 NLRB 39 (1948), made pension plans a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining; and, fourth unions sought pension plans because of the
inadequacy of retirement benefits under government programs.
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1964).
4 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420,
76 Stat. 35 (1962), incorporated into the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 29

U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1964).

5 H.R. 1046, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 3589, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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private pension plans in 1950 would have foreseen the amount of
wealth that such plans would accumulate in less than twenty
years. By 1968 private pension plans covered 47.2 percent of all
workers in private employment, or 28.3 million workers, 6 who
received benefits totalling more than five billion dollars. 7 Moreover, the Securities and Exchange Commission's preliminary
figures indicate that in 1969 the book value of assets in private
pension funds totaled 126.2 billion dollars, almost two and
one-half times the value of private pension plan assets in 1960.8
There is every reason to expect that this enormous growth will
continue. 9
The impact of fund accumulations on the American economy
further illustrates the importance of private pension plans. In
1969 these funds were largely invested in corporate stock valued
at more than forty-seven billion dollars.1 0 In 1959, Professor
Harbrecht noted that the investment of private pension funds in
the securities market has a twofold effect.' On the one hand,
since pension funds tend to be heavy purchasers but infrequent
sellers of corporate stock, they have a stabilizing influence on the
market. On the other hand, their heavy purchases tend to contract
the market and raise the prices of blue chip securities.1 2 After
voicing concern about the growing concentration of control over
pension funds in the hands of bank trustees and the possible
future implications of this development, Professor Harbrecht concluded:
We find a greater concentration of control in the pension
trusts than among the mutual funds, the insurance companies,
and, probably, the banks holding personal trusts. And yet,
unlike the pension trusts, the mutual funds are subject to the
6 This represents an increase of over twice the percentage and three times the number of
workers covered in 1950. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table 118 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 HANDBOOK OF
LABOR STATISTICS].
7 1970 HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table 118.
8
SEC, STATISTICAL SERIES RELEASE No. 2437, Table 2 (1970), in 3 CCH PENSION
PLAN GUIDE
25,137, at 18,312 (1970).
9
One writer estimates that total private pension fund assets by 1981 will value about

220 billion dollars. To date, his statistical computations have fallen short of the actual
growth rate of fund accumulations. See D. HOLLAND, PRIVATE PENSION FUNDS: PROJECTED GROWTH (1966).

10 SEC, STATISTICAL SERIES RELEASE No. 2437, Table 2 (1970), in 3 CCH PENSION
PLAN GUIDE
25,136 at 18,311 (1970). In 1963 corporate stock represented approximately fifty-five percent of total private pension fund assets; cash and deposits represented
one percent of total assets; U.S. Government securities represented three percent; corporate and other bonds represented thirty percent; and mortgages represented five percent.
Id.
11See note 2 supra.
12 p. HARBRECHT,

supra note 2, at 234.
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regulation of the SEC, the insurance companies are rigidly
governed by state agencies and the trustees of personal trusts
have to account to beneficiaries (though this accounting may
not amount to much as a preventive check). The bank
trustees are therefore in a position to wield considerable
economic power through their control of the pension trusts, a
power which is further extended through their stockholdings
for personal trusts. 13

These remarks are even more applicable today. 1 4 The private
pension plan system contains the only large private accumulation
of funds that has escaped the imprimatur of effective federal
regulation.
Such regulation of private pension plans is similarly warranted
in view of the great benefit that such plans are capable of bestowing on the retired worker. In 1969 almost thirteen million retired
Americans were receiving benefits under the Federal OASI system.' 5 The average monthly benefit received by these persons
amounted, however, to only one hundred dollars per month,' 6
while in 1967 a retired couple's average costs on a low budget
were $213 per month in the urban United States.' 7 Although
views differ as to the appropriate role of Social Security,' 8 there is
little doubt that the program by itself is presently inadequate to
meet the needs of retired Americans. Since so very few are able
to accumulate enough money during their working lives to provide
for basic needs after retirement, the private pension plan is often
all that remains to supplement Social Security benefits. 19 It is
13

1d. at 235.See alsoA.

BERLE, ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 12 (1958):
When power is lodged in a particular group it has no choice except either
to exercise it or to try to revolutionize the system. There is no way of
avoiding power ....
The trust funds admit they have it but they have thus far
refused to use it. This situation cannot last much longer. Somebody is bound
to use that power, of necessity. Pension trusts are so concentrated that a
relatively small amount in equities outbalances any number of scattered
holdings.
14 In 1964 the New York Times reported that pension trusts owned 28.4 percent of all
holdings of institutions (including insurance companies, mutual funds, etc.) dealing on the
New York Stock Exchange. This investment equaled approximately twenty-four billion
dollars. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1964, cited by Justin Impellizeri, The Mirage of Private
Pensions, Hearings on H.R. 1045, H.R. 1046, and H.R. 16462 Before the General
Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 386 (1969- 1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 House Hearings].
15 1970 HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table 119, at 284.
16Id.
17Id. at 328.
18
See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 187-94 (1964); Nestingen, Social Security and Health, Welfare and Pension Plans, in 3 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF HEALTH, WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS, TEXTBOOK FOR PENSION AND WELFARE TRUSTEES AND ADMINISTRATORS 549 (1962).

19For a discussion of the various ways in which private pension plans can be integrated
with Social Security see M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 30-32; Buck, Features of
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therefore not surprising that the federal government should undertake to insure that the private pension plan system adequately
fulfills this supplementary function.
III.

ABUSES TO WHICH PENSION FUNDS ARE SUBJECT

A. Imprudent Investment
The problem of imprudent investment is by no means new to
the law. State legislatures and courts have long wrestled with the
problem. One writer describes the history of standards governing
trust investments as follows:
At an early date the Massachusetts court announced what
has come to be known as the prudent man rule governing
trust investments ... and has continued to test the propriety

of a trustee's investments by reference to how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs,
not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent
disposition of their own funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be
invested. Many states, however, not content to stop with
such a general guide, enacted statutes setting up legal lists of
trust securities. Under some statutes the trustee was confined
to the legal list but sometimes ... the statute was construed

as permissive, so as not to prevent the trustee from making
investments outside the legal list provided he met the test of
prudence.
In recent years there has been a strong legislative tendency
to get away from the legal lists and to leave the matter to be
tested by the hypothetical conduct of the prudent man. 20
Although the statement of the prudent man rule is generally the
same, its application, unfortunately, varies considerably from
state to state,2 1 and its effectiveness in controlling the investments
of pension plan trustees and administrators is open to serious
doubt. One primary reason is that many plans do not take the
form of a trust 2 2 and, frequently when they do, the trust inPresent-DayPension Plans, in PENSIONS AND PROFIT
1964).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3(e) (1956).
20

SHARING

26-29 (H. Biegel et al. ed.

G. PALMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND SUCCESSION

617- 18 (1968).
Id. at 618. One of the current sources of difference in application of state prudent man
rules concerns the propriety of investment in common stocks.
22 E.g., group annuity plans under which the employer purchases deferred annuities for
plan participants. See also S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958). The report
states that, "it is not clear that administrators who handle funds only temporarily-passing
them on to insurance companies or a corporate fiduciary-are really trustees in the
accepted legal sense." That is. legal title to the assets never resides in the administrator.
Without such a trust arrangement, it is extremely difficult for plan participants or beneficiaries to establish standing to sue for the administrator's malfeasance.
2i
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strument gives such broad discretion to the trustees as to nullify
the impact of the prudent man rule. 23 Even where the plan re-

quires the funds to be placed in trust and the trust instrument does
not give complete discretion to the trustee in making investments,
few plan participants and beneficiaries either know of the abuses
that are occurring or have adequate resources and motivation to
24
pursue a lawsuit against the trustee.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does provide some standards that are helpful in controlling the investments of pension
fund administrators and trustees. The Code provides that an employer who establishes a "qualified plan" 25 is entitled to limited
deductions based upon the amount which he contributes to the
funding of the plan. 26 In addition to meeting the requirements of a
"qualified plan," a tax exemption for the income accruing from
the employer's contributions 2 7 is available only if the fund does
not engage in any "prohibited transactions" as defined in section
503(b) of the Code. Under that section, the pension fund may not:
lend any of its income or corpus without adequate security2 8 and a
1970 House Hearings 359. Mario E. Impellizeri testified:
A number of pension trust agreements have few restrictions to inhibit the
trustees in managing the money. Some company pension trust agreements,
for example, authorize the trustees to buy securities on credit in their uncontrolled discretion, to issue promissory notes on such terms and conditions as
they see fit. Other company pension trust agreements give full power,
authority, and discretion to engage in any business as if they were the
absolute owners of the fund, and states [sic] that the employer may vary
contributions as it sees fit.
24 With respect to those plans which employ banks as trustees, some federal regulation
with respect to fiduciary standards exists. National banks and state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System are subject to the regulations of the Federal Reserve
Board. For the most part, however, these regulations use state law as the touchstone for
measuring investment standards. See P. HARBRECHT, supra note 2, at 142.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 401(a)-(f). Briefly, the major requirements for a "qualified
plan" are: (I) it must be created and maintained as a domestic trust in the United States;
(2) it must have been established by the employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries; (3) it must be impossible, before the satisfaction of all liabilities
with respect to employees and their beneficiaries, for any part of the corpus or income to
be used for purposes other than the exclusive benefit of the employees or their beneficiaries; (4) it must not discriminate in favor of certain specified classes of employees;
and (5) forfeitures must not be applied to increase the benefits any employee would receive
under the plan. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401- l(a) (1970). For a more complete discussion of
these requirements see M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 198-214.
26 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 404(a).
27 Id. §§ 501(a), 805(d). Under §§ 402(a) and 403(a), the employee-participant is not
taxed on the employer's contribution. He will, however, be taxed on the benefits he
receives after retirement.
28 The test for "adequate security" is whether it may reasonably be anticipated that loss
of principal or interest will not result from the loan. Mortgages or liens on property and
stock or securities issued by corporations other than the borrower are examples of security
considered to be adequate. IOU's are not. Treas. Reg. § 1.503(c)- l(b) (1970). Cf. INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 503(e), which, subject to certain limitations, permits a pension fund
to make loans to the employer if secured by a "bond, debenture, note or certificate or other
evidence of indebtedness."
2
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reasonable rate of interest; pay any compensation in excess of a
reasonable allowance for services; make any of its services available on a preferential basis; sell any substantial part of its securities or other property for less than adequate consideration; or
engage in any other transaction which results in a substantial
diversion of its assets to either the employer creating the plan or a
corporation controlled by the employer.
Unfortunately, several factors hinder the effectiveness of the
Code in preventing such transactions. First, the sanction imposed
by the Code-loss or denial of the fund's tax exemption and the
deductibility of the employer's contributions to the fund-is only
as effective as the incentive to secure or maintain such exemption
or deduction. Although most writers have assumed that tax deductibility of pension plan contributions is a significant incentive
to the employer,2 9 this is not necessarily the case. Insofar as such
contributions serve as a substitute for other forms of compensation-for example, wages and salaries-which are also deductible, the employer gains no special tax advantage from the
deductibility of pension plan contributions.3 0 Thus, the key to the
effectiveness of the sanction lies in the tax-exempt status of the
pension fund's income. If the fund loses its tax exemption and the
employer has guaranteed that a certain sized benefit will be paid
to employees upon retirement, he may be forced to increase his
contributions to the fund to offset that portion of the income lost
to the tax. In turn, however, the employer is permitted to deduct
his additional contribution to the fund. The effectiveness of section 503(b) is also weakened by the fact that the loss of a tax
exemption is applied only to the taxable year in which the section
is violated. In any subsequent year, a claim for exemption can
again be made if accompanied by a written declaration, made
under penalty of perjury, to the effect that the prohibited transaction will not knowingly be engaged in again. 3 1 Moreover, a denial
See, e.g., Biegel & Harmon, Tax Aspects of Pension Plans, in PENSIONS AND PROFIT
41 (H. Biegel et al. ed. 1964); S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1958).
M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 198. See also P. HARBRECHT, supra note 2, at 130.
Of course, Bernstein's remarks only apply when the employer may choose freely between
establishing or maintaining a plan and not establishing or discontinuing one. When the
employer is faced with a strong union's demand for a plan, such alternatives cannot usually
be considered.
31Treas. Reg. § 1.503(d)(1)(a) (1970). However, the I.R.S. has ruled that before an
organization's application for an exemption will be accepted, the circumstances relating to
the prohibited transaction must no longer exist. Rev. Rul. 69-233, 1969- 1 CUM. BULL.
156, in 4 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 3078.50, at 41,135.
Note also that under the regulation the declaration is to be made by a "principal officer
of such [plan] authorized to make such declaration." Since the penalty of perjury is
personal to the officer, it is possible that a change in officers or simply a shifting of the
responsibilities of the officers would make the sanction ineffective.
29

SHARING
30
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of tax exemption does little to help recover the funds lost by
32
improvident investments.
It should be pointed out that the Code is of no assistance in
regulating plans which do not or are unable to seek tax-exempt
status. 33 With respect to such plans, section 503(b)'s fiduciary
standards have no effect at all. A final weakness of section 503(b)
is that it only prohibits certain transactions between the fund and
the employer. At least on its face, it does not purport to deal with
in interest, such
transactions between the fund and other parties
34
as the employee organization or its officers.
In any event, there is little doubt that despite the "prudent man
rule" and section 503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, imprudent
investments do occur. Although most of these ill-advised investments never come to the public's attention, those that do are
certainly spectacular. Often such investments arise from a conflict
of interest into which the administrator or trustee, purposely or
inadvertently, has placed himself. The results of such an arrangement can be disastrous, as was related to the House General
Subcommittee on Labor:
In Chicago, the company-appointed trustee of Brasco Manufacturing Co. put $250,000, or 69 percent of the company
pension fund's total assets, into Brasco's preferred stock. At
and the fund's total
the end of 1964 the stock was worthless
5
assets had shriveled to $13,500.3
Such conflicts of interest and consequent unsound investments
are by no means restricted to company-managed funds. A widely
publicized example of questionable investment involves the
United Mine Workers' policy of keeping as much as seventy
32 In addition, a denial of tax-exempt status can greatly harm the interests of plan
participants. In a letter to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated that the loss of tax-exempt status
might well be a tax penalty on the victims rather than on the perpetrators of
the violation. For example, an employer or trustee who diverted funds might
not be solvent, and the penalty might be assessment of a tax liability against
the fund as well as a denial of tax deferment and capital gains treatment to
the beneficiaries.
S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1958).
33 For example, an unfunded or "pay-as-you-go" plan does not meet the requirements of
a "qualified plan" within the meaning of INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 40 1(a). Nonetheless, it
is not unusual for such a plan to accumulate a large fund to pay for past service liabilities.
1970 House Hearings 33 1.
See
34
Treas. Reg. § 1.503(a)- 1(a) (1970) does, however, provide that
if a trustee or other fiduciary of the [plan] (whether or not he is also a creator
of such [plan] ) enters into a transaction with the organization, such transaction will be closely scrutinized in the light of the fiduciary principle requiring
undivided loyalty to ascertain whether the [plan] is in fact being operated for
the stated exempt purposes.
35 1970 House Hearings 359 (remarks of Mr. Impellizeri).
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million dollars of its pension fund in an interest-free checking
account at the seventy-five percent union-owned National Bank
of Washington. This policy costs the fund over $3.5 million in
interest per year. The union claims that the purpose for this
"investment" is to maintain a readily available strike fund.3 6 Another illustrative example of questionable investment, related by
former Secretary of Labor Schultz, involves the acceptance of
improper security by a jointly-administered pension plan:
The trustees of a pension fund placed 16 million dollars in
a questionable investment, the security for which was a mortgage on a proposed golf course. After the project had gotten
under way, management responsibilities were turned over to

an individual three months after he had been released from
Federal parole. When the mortgagor went bankrupt, the fund
37
suffered a loss of $6.7 million.
B. Other Breaches of FiduciaryDuty
Although imprudent investment constitutes a serious and all
too prevalent abuse of the private pension plan system, an even
more flagrant abuse occurs when the trustee or administrator
takes advantage of his fiduciary position for personal gain. Such
improper management may take many forms- exorbitant fees
charged to the fund by the trustee or administrator,3 8 embezzlement, bribery, graft, kickbacks3 9 (often concealed by finder's
36 Kessler, The Case for Regulation of Pension Funds, Detroit Sunday News, Nov. 29,
1970, § D, at 12. See also 1970 House Hearings 360. It is interesting to note that section
302 of the Taft-Hartley Act, [29 U.S.C. § 186 (1964) ], specifically requires that union
pension funds, like the U.M.W.'s, be administered equally by management and the union.
Thus, either the Act is being violated or, more likely, the employers have given the union
complete control over the choice of investments.
37 1970 House Hearings 471. Loans made by the trustees of the Teamsters Central
States, Southeast and Southwest Area Pension Fund have also been the subject of much
investigation. In one case these trustees allowed their mortgage on Caesar's Palace in Las
Vegas, security for a 16.7 million dollar loan, to be subordinated to a bank's loan of two
million dollars. Morgan & Ayres, Bankroll for the Big Mobs, Oakland Tribune, Sept. 21,
1969, in 1970 House Hearings 121.
3
8See, e.g., 1970 House Hearings 471 (remarks of former Secretary of Labor Schultz):
Five trustees administered 16 pension and [deferred] profit-sharing plans
of a corporation. Of these five, three were past or present officers of the
corporation. In one year, the five trustees received an aggregate of more than
$300,000 in trustees' fees from the corporation's 16 funds, which, in addition,
paid over $130,000 to a separate corporation, controlled by the trustees,
which was established to administer and invest funds of the corporation's
benefit plans. Trust fund management services by a bank trust department
probably would be about $50,000 for a fund of comparable assets.
39
For numerous examples of kickbacks in connection with the Teamsters Central
States, Southeast and Southwest Area Pension Fund, see 1970 House Hearings 120-42,
which contains a series of articles written by Jeff Morgan and Gene Ayres for the Oakland
Tribune, Sept. 21-28, 1969.
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fees), 40 or improper contributions from the employer. 41 However,
as in the case of imprudent investments, only the most spectacular
examples of mismanagement come to the public and the federal
42
government's attention.
Most of the improper activities described above are covered by
two sections of title 18 of the United States Code. 43 Section 664
specifically covers embezzlement, theft and conversion. 4 4 Section
1954 covers kickbacks, graft, and bribery. 45 Unfortunately, the
effectiveness of these sections of title 18 is open to some ques-

tion. 46 It is difficult to get informants who are willing to testify to
crimes because all interested parties generally acquiesce in their
commission. 47 In addition, section 1954 is especially difficult, if
40 A "finder's fee" is a fee paid by a person who desires a loan to persons who "find"
loans for the pension fund. It is, however, perfectly legal to compensate a person for acting
as an intermediary between an organization or person seeking a loan and an organization
that lends money. United States v. Marroso, 250 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mich. 1966), infra
note 48. The problem arises when the "finder" splits his fee with the pension fund trustee
or administrator. It is, to say the least, extremely difficult to prove that such splitting
occurred. See S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1961).
41 See 1970 House Hearings 27 1.
42 See Morgan & Ayres, Bankrollfor the Big Mobs, Oakland Tribune, Sept. 21, 1969, in
1970 House Hearings 122.
43 18 U.S.C. §§ 664, 1954 (1964). Section 1954 was modeled after § 302 of the
Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1964).
44 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1964) makes unlawful the embezzlement, theft or conversion of any
assets of an employee pension benefit plan by any person and imposes a penalty of a ten
thousand dollar fine or imprisonment for not more than five years for any violation.
45 18 U.S.C. § 1954 (1964) prohibits any officer, agent, employee, or other representative of the pension fund, the employer, the employee organization, or any organization
which provides services to the pension fund (for example, an investment counseling
service) from receiving, agreeing to receive, or soliciting any fee, kickback, gift, money, or
anything else of value with intent to be influenced with respect to any of his actions,
decisions, or other duties concerning the fund. In addition, § 1954 prohibits any person
from directly or indirectly giving, offering, or promising to give or offer, any fee, kickback,
etc. Violation of this section is punishable by a fine of ten thousand dollars and/or
imprisonment for not more than five years.
46 Two reported convictions have been found under 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1964): United
States v. Moore, 427 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1970), where the defendant converted for his own
use, refund checks from the insurance company carrying the coverage for his employer's
welfare plan; United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1970), where the defendant was convicted of having converted to his own use the proceeds from the sale of an airconditioner which was owned by his union's welfare plan.
All states have embezzlement laws which should be applicable to the embezzlement of
pension funds. However, the following statement made in the report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1958 reveals concern over enforceability of these
laws:
While State criminal laws adequately cover outright embezzlement by
trustees or employees few cases involving benefit plans have been prosecuted. Aside from the problem of strict construction of criminal statutes and
difficulty of proof, there have been relatively few instances of patent appropriation or diversion which could be prosecuted appropriately under such
State criminal statutes.
S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958). It is somewhat anomalous that Congress
should enact a federal embezzlement statute four years later. It is arguable that the same
problem noted above with respect to the difficulties of enforcing state embezzlement
statutes would also apply to § 664.
47 See note 42 supra.
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not impossible, to enforce because the courts require the government to prove a clear agency relationship between the person who
48
"finds" the loan for the fund and the fund itself.

IV.

THE CURRENT WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS
DISCLOSURE ACT: ITS PURPOSE AND DEFECTS

The policy underlying enactment of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 was purportedly to protect the
interest of welfare and pension plan participants and beneficiaries
49
through disclosure of information with respect to such plans.
The primary requirement of the Act was that the plan administrator compile, file with the Secretary of Labor, and send to
participants and their beneficiaries upon written request a description and annual report of the plan. 50 Although failure to comply
with the disclosure requirements of the Act subjected the plan
administrator to certain civil and/or criminal sanctions, 5 1 the
primary responsibility for regulation of the plans was originally
intended to be left to the states. 52 Congress apparently believed
that a policy of mandatory disclosure and, hopefully, an attendant
policy of self-policing on the part of plan administrators, participants and beneficiaries would prevent the mismanagement of pri-

vate pension plans.5 3
It took Congress only three years to realize that the Act's
modest disclosure provisions had failed to prevent imprudent
48 In United States v. Marroso, 250 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mich. 1966), the only reported
case found under the relevant provisions of § 1954, the defendant represented himself as
one who could obtain loans from the Teamsters' Pension Fund and influenced the grant of
a one million dollar loan to the lendee for a "fee" of twenty-five thousand dollars. The
court held that the defendant was neither an express nor a 'de facto' agent of the
Teamsters' Fund within the meaning of § 1954(a)(1), because the Fund had failed to
clearly manifest its consent to the agency relationship. The Marroso decision, if followed,
renders § 1954 virtually ineffective. First, it is unlikely that any pension fund administrator
who wants to receive kickbacks would expressly appoint an agent to secure loans for the
fund. Second, unless the agent is expressly appointed, it will be extremely difficult to
establish the clear manifestation of consent to an agency relationship required by the court.
Finally, very few plan administrators are foolish enough to accept a kickback directly from
the debtor. Rather, they are more apt to share the "legitimate" finder's fee with the finder.
4929 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1964).
50 29 U.S.C. §§ 304, 305, 307 (1964). These sections and the proposed amendments to
them are discussed in greater detail in the text accompanying notes 67-75 infra.
5 1 29 U.S.C. § 308(a), (b) (1964).
5
2 S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1958).
53 The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare states:
Complete disclosure of the details of welfare and pension plan operations
provides the most effective single deterrent against abuses and the many
other weaknesses of these plans. It would provide the greatest incentive to
good management and investment policies and the best protection to the
interests and rights of employers, employees, and the Government alike.
S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1958). See also S. REP. No. 891, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1961).
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investments, 5 4 that the states were either unwilling or unable to
protect the plans from embezzlement, conversion, exorbitant
fees, kickbacks, etc. 55 and that the plans were too susceptible to
grievous loss resulting from such abuses. 56 In order to remedy
these defects, Congress amended the Act in four principal respects. 5 7 First, a more detailed disclosure of the assets of the
pension plan was required. 58 Second, the Secretary of Labor was
given broader investigatory powers to discover violations of the
Act's disclosure provisions. 59 Third, the amended Act required
the bonding of all administrators, officials and employees handling
funds or other assets of the plan. 60 Finally, criminal penalties
were imposed for embezzlement, conversion, exorbitant fees and
kickbacks, 6 1 and for the knowing falsification or concealment of
facts required to be disclosed by the Act. 62 To date, these are the
last amendments to the 1958 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act.
Experience is the test of any piece of legislation, and experience has not treated the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act kindly. Disclosure has not effectively reduced the
instances of improper management, nor has it led to compliance
with accepted fiduciary standards. 6 3 Few participants or beneficiaries have brought suit under the Act, and in those instances
when they have, the courts have tended to construe the Act's
provisions strictly.
One particularly restrictive case is Doherty v. Sylvania Pension
Plan for Hourly Employees, 6 4 where the plaintiff, an employee
covered by the Sylvania Plan, brought an action under section
308(b) 65 of the Act seeking to enforce the prescribed statutory
54 S. REP. No. 908, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1961).
55 Id. at 4-6.
56
Id. at 6.
57 For a more detailed analysis of the 1962 amendments see Note, The Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act-Its History, Operation and Amendment, 30 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 682 (1962); Blakey, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of
1962,38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 263 (1963).
5829 U.S.C. § 306(b) (1964).

59 Id. § 308(d).
60
1d.
61 18 U.S.C. §§ 664, 1954 (1964), see text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
62 18 U.S.C. § 1027 (1964).
63 See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
64 310 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Mass. 1970). For a similarly strict construction of § 308(b), see
Harrold v. Coble, 261 F. Supp. 29 (M.D.N. Car. 1966), affd, 380 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1967).
8 29 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1964), provides:
Any administrator of a plan who fails or refuses, upon the written request
of a participant or beneficiary covered by such plan, to make publication to
him within thirty days of such request, in accordance with the provisions of
section 307 of this title, of a description of the plan or an annual report... may in the court's discretion become liable to any such participant or
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penalty for the administrator's failure to provide him with a description and annual report of the Sylvania Pension Plan. One of
the plaintiffs two letters to the administrator made "a formal
demand for an accounting of what was paid out to employees or
others for any reason in each year, and what the total assets of the
plan amounted to in each of these years." 66 The court held that
the claim for relief failed on three grounds. First, the court said
that plaintiffs letter demanded "considerable information above
and beyond" that to which he was entitled.6 7 This conclusion
seems difficult to support in light of the language of section
307(a)(2) of the Act requiring the administrator to provide plaintiff
with an adequate summary of the latest annual report. It does not
seem unreasonable to expect such a summary to include a statement of benefits paid and the plan's total assets since this information must be contained in the annual report.6 8 Such information was essentially all that plaintiff demanded. Furthermore, the court said that the defendant did not understand the
letter as requesting the statutorily required information.6 9 Apparently, the court would require the plaintiff to adopt the verbatim
language of the Act in making demands upon the fund's administrator. Finally, although the court asserted that the plaintiff had
not shown any injury resulting from the administrator's failure to
supply the requested information, 70 the court did not clarify what
type of injury should have been shown. 7 1 More important, it is
hard to envisage any injury that might occur before it is too late
for the employee-participant to take action to protect the plan
from loss.
The Secretary of Labor and the Justice Department have had
little more success in enforcing the Act than pension plan participants and beneficiaries. Section 308(a), which provides for a fine
of not more than one thousand dollars or imprisonment for not
more than six months for a willful violation of any provision of the
Act, has resulted in only one conviction, 72 although in 1968 more
beneficiary making such request in the amount of $50 a day from the date of
such failure or refusal.
66310 F. Supp. at 1333.
67id.
68 29 U.S.C. § 306(b) (1964). Although it is true that plaintiff demanded information for
each year of the plan's existence, this should not excuse the administrator from furnishing
it for the latest year.
69310
F. Supp. at 1333.
70
1d.
71Id. Plaintiffs brief did allege that he "may have sustained an economic injury." The
case of Harrold v. Coble, 261 F. Supp. 29 (M.D.N. Car. 1966), also required that plaintiff
show that he suffered injury.
72 1970 House Hearings488.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 4:2

than 1,800 cases were opened. 73 The mens rea requirement of
willfulness in proceedings under that section has, in large part,
been the cause of the ineffective criminal prosecution. 74 Finally,
as noted earlier, the 1962 amendments to title 18 have generally
not been helpful in preventing the abuses that have plagued pri75
vate pension plans.
V.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE WELFARE
AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT

A. Proposed FederalStandards of FiduciaryResponsibility
The minority report of the House Committee on Education and
Labor in discussing the 1962 amendments to the Welfare and
Pension Plans Disclosure Act states:
Although this bill specifically states that nothing contained
in it shall be construed or implied as to authorize the Secretary to regulate or interfere in the management of any employee welfare or pension benefit plan, the question can also
be asked, how long will it be before the Secretary comes back
to Congress and requests such authority? This is certainly a
very real possibility, for 2 years of administering the
act... would furnish ample time for the Secretary to compile
the necessary facts and figures to support the contention that
he must be given the authority to regulate such plans if the
76
public interest is to be protected.

While the minority report may have misjudged the length of time
necessary for the Secretary to compile his "facts and figures," it
correctly foresaw the request for further regulation of private
pension plans.
Two major bills, H.R. 104677 and S. 3589,78 were introduced in
the 91st Congress to add standards of fiduciary responsibility to
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. 79 Although they
71d. at 489. This statistic is even more significant in light of the fact that cases are
opened only aftera failure to obtain the administrator's voluntary compliance.
74 The Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor states that no civil or
criminal penalty "shall be enforced except for deliberate defiance or persistent refusal in
bad faith to comply with a clear obligation imposed by the provisions of this Act." H.R.
REP. No. 2283, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1958).
75 See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra; see also 1970 House Hearings475.
76 H.R. REP. No. 998, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1961).
77 91 St Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 1046].
78
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as S. 3589].
7 The difference in the focus of the two bills from that of the Act is immediately evident
in their statements of policy. The statement in H.R. 1046 § 2(b) will suffice to indicate this
change (amended portions in italics):
It is. . . declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee welfare and pension
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represent a vast improvement over the current Act, their
effectiveness in preventing violations of standards of fiduciary
responsibility is open to serious doubt.
1. Coverage -Both bills provide for the same general coverage
as the current Act. They define an employee pension benefit plan
as any fund or program, communicated or described in writing to
the employees, and established by an employer and/or employee

organization to provide retirement benefits for its participants or
their befieficiaries.8 0 This definition is clearly intended to be broad
enough to cover all possible variations in all types of private
pension plans. 81
Not all of these plans, however, are subject to the fiduciary
responsibility sections of the two bills. 82 The fiduciary responsibility sections apply solely to "employee benefit funds," defined

as funds of money or other assets "maintained pursuant to or in
connection with" an employee pension benefit plan.8 3 While this
definition of "fund" would seem, by itself, to exclude all unfunded
plans, the House bill specifically exempts plans under which benefits are provided "solely from the general assets of an employer
or of an employee organization. '"84 Both bills8 also exempt all

assets of investment companies that are subject to regulation
benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting
to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto by establishing fiduciary standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation upon all persons engaged in, or responsible for receiving,
disbursing, or exercising any control or authority with respect to employee
welfare and pension benefit funds and by providing for sanctions in case of a
willful breach of such fiduciary standards as well as for recovery of losses
suffered by such funds by reason of such breach.
8029 U.S.C. § 302(a)(2) (1964); H.R. 1046, § 3(2); S.3589, § 3(b).
81 Included within the terms of this definition are unfunded or "pay-as-you-go" plans,
deferred profit-sharing plans, and plans which are funded through the medium of a contract
with an insurance carrier. However, both bills, like the Act, exempt the following plans
from their general coverage: (1)plans administered by any governmental unit; (2) plans
established and maintained "solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation disability insurance laws" (this
exemption relates solely to private welfare plans); (3) plans administered by certain
tax-exempt organizations which do not represent their members for purposes of collective
bargaining; (4) plans covering not more than twenty-five participants, 29 U.S.C. § 303(b)
(1964); H.R. 1046, § 4(b); S.3589, § 4(b). The reason for these exemptions is primarily to
reduce the administrative workload of both the Secretary of Labor and the administrators
of these types of plans. In addition, there is a presumption that abuse is less likely with
respect to the first three types of plans. S. REP. No. 1440, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1958).
No objection was made to these: exemptions during either the 1968 or 1970 House
Hearings.
For a more detailed discussion of the extent and purpose of these exemptions, see The
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act-its History, Operation, and Amendment,
supra note 57, at 699- 703.
82 H.R. 1046, § 14; S.3589, § 14.
SH.R. 1046, § 14(a); S.3589, § 3(a).
a H.R. 1046, § 14(b)(1).

H.R. 1046, § 14(b)(4); S.3589, § 3(q).
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under the Investment Company Act of 1940.86 Since most investment companies are now subject to strict regulation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the purpose of this exemption is to maintain a single standard of fiduciary responsibility
and to avoid the conflicts that might arise between the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Secretary of Labor in administering such standards.
In addition, both bills exempt premiums or subscription charges
paid to and monies deposited with insurance carriers. 8 7 This provision would exempt, for example, an insured group annuity pension plan under which the employer annually pays premiums to
the insurance carrier toward the purchase of an annuity. The
insurer is obligated to pay the benefits of the plan to the extent of
the premiums received on behalf of each employee.8 8 Because the
insurance carrier does not establish a separate fund with these
premiums and because insurance carriers-are already subjected to
rather stringent state regulation, this exemption is understandable.8 9 Nevertheless, S. 3589 specifically, and H.R. 1046
impliedly,9 0 provide that the fiduciary responsibility sections shall
apply to separate accounts if such accounts are established and
maintained by insurance carriers with monies deposited by the
employer or employee organization.9 1 An example of an insured
86 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1964). There is a slight, but significant, semantical difference with
respect to this exemption in both bills. H.R. 1046 applies to investment companies
"registered" under the Investment Company Act of 1940. S. 3589 applies to investment
companies "subject to regulation" under the 1940 Act. It has been suggested that "subject
to regulation" is the more appropriate phraseology, since some investment companies who
need not register under the 1940 Act are nonetheless subject to its provisions. The
Subcommittee of the Committee on Pension and Profit Sharing Trusts, Proposals for
Federal Prudent Man Rule in Employee Benefit Plans, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J.
21, 25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Pension and Profit Sharing Trusts].
87 H.R. 1046, § 14(b)(2); S. 3589, § 3(q)(2).
88 M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 16; St. John, Financing A Pension Plan, in PENSIONS AND PROFIT SHARING 89-113 (H. Biegel et al. ed. 1964).
89 The AFL-CIO has stated its opposition to exemption of investment companies and
insurance carriers from the fiduciary responsibility sections of these bills. The AFL-CIO's
position is that fiduciary responsibility should be uniformly applied, whether the "trust is
administered by an employer, an insurance carrier ... or investment company." 1970
House Hearings 110 (remarks of Mr. Biemiller).
90 Committee on Pension and Profit Sharing Trusts 24; see also note 91 infra.
91 H.R. 1046, § 14(b)(3); S. 3589, § 3(q)(2). A separate account is defined in S. 3589,
§ 3(r) as
an account established or maintained by an insurance company under which
income, gains, and losses, whether or not realized, from assets allocated to
such account, are, in accordance with the applicable contract, credited to or
charged against such account without regard to other income, gains, or losses
of the insurance company.
The separate accounts procedure is a relatively recent development that grew out of the
desire of insurance companies to be more competitive with trusteed plans. See St. John,
supra note 88, at 141.
H.R. 1046, § 14(b)(3) exempts "moneys deposited with an insurance carrier, the repay-
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plan with a separate account is the group deposit administration
plan, under which the employer's premiums are accumulated in a
separate account and invested in various equities. 9 2 When an
employee retires, the insurance company purchases an annuity for
him by withdrawing from the account the amount required to
provide the employee's total benefits. 93 Separate accounts are,
then, administered much like any other pension fund. To insure a
uniform standard of fiduciary responsibility with respect to pension funds, the inclusion of the separate accounts procedure within the coverage of the fiduciary responsibility sections of these
94
bills is desirable, if not necessary.
These bills have been criticized because the fiduciary responsibility provisions are limited to funded plans, thereby unduly
restricting the coverage of these proposals and, as a result, their
effectiveness. 9 5 It would, however, be impracticable to further
expand coverage of the fiduciary responsibility sections. To
effectively cover unfunded plans, the federal government would
have to regulate the administration of the general assets of the
employers, the insurance carrier, and the investment company. In
addition to bearing the increased administrative burden, the federal government would be forced into the area of insurance regulation- something that, to date, it has been unwilling to do. Furthermore, conflicts would inevitably arise between the fiduciary
responsibility provisions of these bills and similar provisions of
state law regulating insurance companies and the Investment
Company Act of 1940. Finally, most of the violations of fiduciary
responsibility seem to occur only with respect to funded plans.
For all of these reasons, restriction of the coverage of these
provisions to funded plans seems entirely warranted.
2. The Employee Benefit Fund as a Trust-Both bills undertake to further define and limit the purpose of an employee benefit
fund. The Senate bill, for example, provides that every employee
ment of which, including interest thereon, is guaranteed." The key to whether the language
of this provision includes separate accounts is the word "interest." Since separate accounts, like most funds, generate income (not interest), it is probable that this provision
was not intended to exempt them. The language is, however, ambiguous and should be
modified to specifically include separate accounts. See H.R. 1046, § 7(f)(1)(G), which
specifically refers to separate accounts in discussing the information which the annual
report must include to meet the bill's disclosure requirements.
92 More often, however, the premiums contributed to a group deposit administration plan
are commingled with the general assets of the insurance company. See St. John, supra note
88, at 117. If this is the case, these funds are exempt from the fiduciary responsibility
provisions of both bills. See note 89 supra.
93 St. John, supra note 88, at 114-15.
94

See note 89 supra.

95 1970 House Hearings 110 (remarks of Mr. Biemiller); Davis, When the 'Pension

Ship' is Scuttled, Wall St. Journal, Feb. 12, 1971, at 6, col. 4.
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benefit fund shall be deemed to be a trust held for the exclusive
purpose of providing benefits to its participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the
fund. 96 If this statement were all that the fiduciary responsibility
sections of these bills contained, they would nonetheless have a
significant impact upon the administration of private pension
plans. First, defining an employee benefit fund as a trust should
force the courts in all states to apply the standards of fiduciary
responsibility of the common law of trusts to private pension
funds. Neither bill, however, leaves the incidents of such standards totally to private trust law.9 7 Second, requiring that the fund
be held for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries should severely limit the
abuses that derive from improper use of pension funds. This
requirement should, for example, prevent the United Mine Workers Fund from continuing to hold seventy million dollars in an
interest-free checking account for the purpose of maintaining a
readily available strike fund. 98 Such an "investment" is hardly for
the exclusive purpose of providing retirement benefits to participants. Finally, further limiting the use of the fund to "defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan" should prevent
pension fund administrators from charging exorbitant fees and
salaries to the fund. However, a provision limiting costs to reasonable expenses does not eliminate such problems as the finder's
99
fee.
3. Who is a Fiduciary-A fiduciary relationship may be generally defined as a relationship in which "the law demands of one
party an unusually high standard of ethical or moral conduct with
reference to another." 10 0 The law has embellished these relationships with certain duties which the fiduciary may not breach.
However in analyzing any case in which a fiduciary relationship
might exist, the initial consideration is determining whether the
individual is a fiduciary.

96S. 3589, § 14(a). H.R. 1046, § 14(a).

See text accompanying notes 107 et seq. infra.
98 See text accompanying note 36 supra. Of course, any fund would be able to avoid the
requirements of the bills by altering its funding method, e.g., utilizing a "pay-as-you-go"
method. Such alteration of funding method would, however, generally require the approval
of both the employer and employee organization and would entail a loss of the fund's
tax-exempt status and the employer's right to deduct his contributions to the fund. INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § 40 1(a).
990 0Supra note 45.
G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § I (2d ed. 1965).
97

WINTER

1970]

Pension Plans Disclosure Act

Both bills define the word "fiduciary" broadly. The Senate bill
defines a fiduciary as
any person who exercises any power of control, management,
or disposition with respect to any moneys or other property
of an employee benefit fund, or has authority or responsibility
to do so. 10 1
The House bill provides that
[e]very person who receives, disburses, or exercises any control or authority with respect to any employee benefit fund is
102
a fiduciary ....
For the most part, both definitions would equally apply to most
persons associated with the plan. For example, both can easily be
construed to encompass all officials, administrators, or trustees
who exercise actual control over a fund's policy and operation.
Likewise, both definitions would cover an investment counselor
paid by the fund to guide its investment policies and even lesser
employees who perform the more ministerial functions with respect to the day-to-day operations of the fund. 10 3 Nevertheless, in
a few instances, the bills might treat persons differently. An example would be the case of the director of a fund who, while
charged with management responsibilities by the trust instrument
or collective bargaining agreement, abdicates his responsibility to
other directors. 10 4 Under the Senate bill he would still be a
fiduciary with respect to the duties abdicated, since he retains the
"authority" or "responsibility" to exercise a "power of control or
management." However, under the definition of the House bill
this may not be the case, since through his inactivity he no longer
"exercises any control or authority."' 1 5 As a matter of policy, it
would be best to remove this doubt by adopting the definition of
fiduciary in the Senate bill. It would seem to be in the interests of
plan participants to insure that administrators, directors, and/or
trustees scrutinize the activities of each other. This could best be
101

S. 3589, § 3(w).

102 H.R. 1046, § 14(d).
103 Both bills make it clear that the fiduciary is only held responsible with respect to the

exercise of his own duties. H.R. 1046, § 14(d); S.3589, § 14(b)(1). H.R. 6204, 91st Cong.,
IstSess. (1969), is ambiguous on this point, and it is at least arguable that any fund
employee can be held liable for all breaches of fiduciary responsibility-surely an unsatisfactory state of affairs.
104 This seems to be the case with respect to the employer-appointed directors of the
Teamsters Fund. See 1970 House Hearings 13 1.
105 Although it may be arguable that our hypothetical director has "disbursed" control or
authority within the meaning of "fiduciary" as defined by H.R. 1046, the word "disburse"
was probably intended to refer to a delegation of control or authority to an agent.
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achieved by holding all fiduciaries responsible for the actions of
10 6
their co-fiduciaries.
4. The Prudent Man -In the law of trusts the "prudent man
rule" is generally the standard against which a trustee's performance in administering a trust fund is measured. 10 7 Unfortunately,
this rule has been applied to private pension plans only when the
plan's fund creates a trust.1 0 8 Where the court finds that the plan's
fund is trusteed, the prudent man rule of the state in which the
fund has its situs is the applicable standard.1 0 9 H.R. 1046 and S.
3589 attempt to solve these problems by imposing a federal prudent man rule on the performance of all pension fund fiduciaries.
Their statements of the rule do, however, differ. H.R. 1046 provides that
106S. 3589, § 14(a) accomplishes this result by providing that a fiduciary has the
affirmative obligation to prevent any cofiduciary with whom he undertakes or is required to
undertake the performance of a duty or the exercise of a power from breaching a
"responsibility, obligation, or duty of a fiduciary" unless he promptly objects in writing to
the Secretary of Labor. It should be noted, however, that the duty is an absolute one, and
there is no requirement that the fiduciary have knowledge of his cofiduciary's breach. This
seems a rather harsh requirement.
On the other hand, the House bill is inadequate in this respect. Section 14(h) of that bill
requires a trustee to use reasonable care to prevent his co-trustee from committing a
breach of trust, or to compel a co-trustee to redress a breach of trust. The proviso to that
section states that:
nothing . . . shall excuse a co-trustee for liability for inactivity in the administration of the trust nor for the failure to prevent a breach of trust.
Although the term "trustee" is not defined in the bill, other provisions indicate that the
term is used in a technical sense and is not meant to encompass other pension fund
fiduciaries [see, e.g., § 3(14)]. The following example of the typical management structure
of a deferred profit-sharing plan best illustrates some of the problems that result from the
resticted coverage of this provision:
Generally, three or more individuals who are officers or other employees
of the employer or representatives of the union are appointed as members of
a "Profit-Sharing Committee." This committee is charged with the responsibility of ... making the decisions which are necessary in the day-to-day
operation of the profit-sharing plan. Sometimes the members of this committee are also named as trustees and as custodian of the profit-sharing fund.
In other cases, a bank or trust company is designated as trustee .... The
Profit-Sharing Committee, if desired, may have the right to instruct the
trustee concerning the type of investments which should be made from time
to time or may have a veto power over the investments proposed by the
trustee.
Fefferman, Deferred Profit-Sharing Plans, in PENSIONS AND PROFIT SHARING 199 (H.
Biegel et al. ed. 1964). In addition, the "committee" will generally have the power to
determine who will be the trustee and to make the basic policy decisions as to the goals of
the fund. When a committee has such power, the question of liability for inactivity (the §
14(h)
proviso) should not turn on whether the committee is technically a trustee.
10 7
See text accompanying notes 20- 24 supra.
108 It is not easy to determine when a pension fund is a trust. Various courts, for
example, have characterized the United Mines Workers Fund as a trust, George v. Lewis,
228 F. Supp. 725, 729 (D. Colo. 1964); an unincorporated association, Pavlovask v.
Lewis, 168 F. Supp. 839, 841 (W.D. Pa. 1958), affd, 274 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 990; and sui generis, Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp. 259 F.2d 346, 355
(6th Cir. 1958).
1
0' George v. Lewis, supra note 108; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 272 (Proposed Official Draft No. 5, 1969).
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[e]ach fiduciary shall discharge his duties with regard to the
fund with the same degree of care and skill as a man of
ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his property.110
Although a number of states apply this statement of the rule to
private trusts, the courts have generally stressed that the rule does
not refer to the trustee's use of care in dealing with his own
property as if he had only himself to consider. Rather, say most
courts, the standard to be applied is that of the "ordinarily prudent man who is trustee of another person's property."" '1 If this is
the standard that the House bill intends to apply, the drafters
should have been more explicit. In addition, this definition, familiar as it is to the common law of trusts, might encourage the
courts to apply state trust law to private pension funds.11 2 This
result would frustrate two of the principal motivations behind the
bills: to insure uniformity in pension fund investment standards
and to provide for the sometimes unique aims of private pension
fund investment. For example, some states, applying their own
version of the prudent man rule, require a trustee to diversify his
investments;"13 other states do not recognize such a duty." 4 Although either approach might be acceptable if consistently followed in all jurisdictions, a rule based on the varying provisions of
state law would undoubtedly cause pension fund administrators
(especially those managing large interstate funds) some confusion
in determining which standards to apply. Moreover, various peculiarities in state trust law might discourage certain types of
pension fund investment which would be beneficial to plan partici1 15
pants.
The statement of the prudent man rule in the Senate bill solves
these problems, but necessarily creates another. Section 14(b)(1)
provides that a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to
the fund
with the care under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such

110 H.R. 1046, § 14(d).
111 In re Cook's Trust Estate, 20 Del Ch. 123, 124, 171 A. 730, 731 (1934); A. SCOTT,
supra note 131, at § 227.3.
112 Committee on Pension and Profit Sharing Trusts, supra note 86 at 25.
113 See, e.g., Dickinson, Appellant, 125 Mass. 184, 25 N.E. 99 (1890).
114See, e.g., In re Saeger's Estate, 340 Pa. 73, 16 A.2d 19 (1940).
115 For example, as a matter of policy one may want to encourage private pension funds
to invest in low-income housing. However, because of the lower rate of return on such
investments, a private trustee may be precluded from doing so by the state's prudent man
rule. See 1970 House Hearings 186 (remarks of the late Mr. Reuther).
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matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like

character and with like aims ....
By measuring the fiduciary's performance in light of the "conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims," the courts
would be required to take into account the sometimes unique
goals of private pension plans,1 16 and consequently to develop
new standards of prudence with respect to such plans.1 1 7 However, until new standards are developed, fiduciaries may be some-

what uncertain as to what degree of care they must exercise. In
any event, they will be able to rely on past practices of
well-administered plans as a guide to their actions.
5. The Specifics: What a Fiduciary May and May Not
Do-Both bills conceive the prudent man rule as the basic standard against which the actions of fiduciaries are to be measured.
Yet, not all problems of fiduciary responsibility are left solely to
that rule. Rather, both bills specifically enumerate certain actions
which a fiduciary may and may not undertake. In part, such
enumeration is designed to take into account the uniqueness of
private pension plans. More importantly, the drafters feared that
without specific enumeration fiduciaries would continue to mismanage private pension funds.
(a) Lending Trust Assets and the Duty of Undivided Loyalty-Subject to the prudent man rule, the "legal lists,"118 and any

express provisions in the trust instrument, the common law of
trusts generally permits a trustee to lend money to individuals and
corporations if the loan is properly. secured.1 19 Although the defi-

nition of "proper security" varies from state to state, it is
uniformly held that personal security alone is insufficient.1 20
116

1d.

117 Because of S. 3589's liberal grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts (concurrent

jurisdiction in the federal and state courts when the action is brought by a participant or
beneficiary; exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts when the action is brought by the
Secretary), its generous venue requirements (venue may attach where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found), its
grant of broad removal power to the Secretary of Labor, and its provision for worldwide
service of process, there is even less chance of inconsistent standards. S. 3589, § 9.
Moreover, § 18 expressly provides that the bill's provisions shall "supersede any and all
laws of the states and of political subdivisions thereof' to the extent that they relate to the
"fiduciary, reporting and disclosure responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of" these
plans. State courts would, therefore, be bound to apply the federal prudent man rule as
developed by the federal courts. See Dice v. Akron. C. & Y.R.R., 352 U.S. 359 (1952).
The provisions of H.R. 1046 are comparably liberal in these respects.
118 See text accompanying note 20 supra.
11 G. BOGERT, supra note 100, at § 680. To meet the test of prudence, a proper rate of
return on the loan is mandatory.
120 Id.:

Even if the trustee is investing under the prudent man rule or has discretion [from the trust instrument] as to investments, the investment in an
unsecured loan would appear to be improper, since it would involve a lack of
reasonable care and judgment or an abuse of discretion.
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Moreover, security of the first rank (e.g., first mortgage or senior
lien) is generally necessary.' 2 ' Since the death or financial ruin of
the borrower might severely jeopardize the trust assets, the need
for these requirements is obvious. Although neither bill specifically addresses these problems, the courts will undoubtedly in12 2
corporate these requirements into the federal prudent man rule.
The common law of trusts also prohibits the trustee from lending trust assets to himself, his relatives, his employees, and, in
general, anyone with whom he will not be dealing at arm's length.
The duty imposed is one of undivided loyalty and is designed to
prohibit trustees from representing conflicting interests. 123 Since
the duty is absolute, such loans are improper regardless of how
1 24
prudent or well secured they may be.
Consistent with the common law's insistence upon undivided
loyalty, the fiduciary responsibility sections of both bills proscribe
loans of pension fund assets to certain interested parties. The
Senate bill provides that a pension fund fiduciary shall not lend
any fund assets to "any person known to be a party in interest.' 25 The term "party in interest" is defined as (1) the
administrator, trustee, officer, custodian, counsel or employee of
the plan; (2) any person (including a corporation) providing services to the plan; (3) the employer whose employees are covered
by the plan; (4) any person controlling, controlled by, or under
common control with, the employer; (5) an officer, employee or
agent of the employer or person providing services to the plan; (6)
an employee organization having members covered by the plan;
(7) an officer, employee or agent of such employee organization;
or (8) a relative, 126 partner, or joint venturer of any of the
above. 12 7 Although the House bill is less specific, it seems to be
comparably inclusive.' 2 8 One definitional problem, however, may
121 This is frequently a requirement of the "legal lists." See G. BOGERT, supra note 100,
at § 680. However, in In re Cook's Trust Estate, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 124, 171 A. 730, 731
(1934), the court held that a trustee's investment in certain debentures was prudent,
because the bonds had the "most favorable rating."
122 An incorporation of these requirements into the federal prudent man rule would, for
example, have prevented the Teamsters Fund from subordinating the mortgages on their
loan of seventeen million dollars to Caesar's Palace behind a two million dollar loan of a
Nevada
bank. 1970 House Hearings 121.
123
G. BOGERT, supra note 100, at § 543(J), (T).
124 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1953).
121 S. 3589, § 14(b)(2)(F).

126 Both the Senate and House bills define a relative as: "a spouse, ancestor, descendant,
brother, sister, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law, or
sister-in-law." H.R. 1046, § 14(e); S.3589, § 3(n).
127 S. 3589, § 3(m).

128 H.R. 1046, § 14(e), provides:

No loan of money or other assets shall be made from an employee benefit
fund to a fiduciary with relation to such fund, or to any relative of such
fiduciary, or to his employer, employee, partner, or other business associate,
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arise in conjunction with the House bill. Section 14(e) prohibits
loans to a "labor organization for the benefit of whose members
the fund was established" or to an "employer who contributes to
the fund on account of his employees," or to an official of either
entity. The bill does not define "official" (nor does any section of
title 29). Thus, it is unclear whether the scope of this term is
intended to encompass officers, employees, and agents of such
organizations, as does S. 3589's definition of party in interest.
While every official is certainly either an officer, employee or
agent, with the possible exception of an officer, the converse does
not necessarily follow. Indeed, it is most probable that except for
those employees or agents who occupy a fiduciary relationship
with respect to the employee benefit fund, employees and agents
are intended to be excluded from the provisions of the section.
Such a construction is supported by the fact that other parts of
section 14 (e.g., section 14(f)(4)(B)) specifically refer to "an
officer, employee, or agent."
Another difference in this section of the bill is that the House
bill is absolute in its prohibition. Unlike S. 3589, it does not limit
its prohibition of loans by the fund fiduciary to known parties in
interest. Thus the fiduciary must, at his own risk, make an effort
to determine the identity of the borrower. The advantage of this
added protection must be weighed against any policy considerations discouraging the imposition of responsibility for inadvertent breaches of the fiduciary duty.
Although the federal prudent man rule would also proscribe
many of these loans, the duty of undivided loyalty is a crucial
requirement that must be closely guarded to prevent the fiduciary
from using his position for personal gain. Certainly the bills'
specific prohibitions will have a more than casual prophylactic
effect, and at least with respect to loans will adequately insure
that the duty of undivided loyalty will be maintained. 129
(b) The Purchaseand Sale of Pension Fund Assets-The law
or to a labor organization for the benefit of whose members the fund was
established or to any official thereof, or to an employer who contributes to
the fund or account of his employees or any official of such employer.
The use of the word "fiduciary" in this provision would seem to be sufficient to cover most
of the specific persons listed in S. 3589's definition of "party in interest." For example, a
person providing services to the plan (e.g., an investment counselor) is probably a person
who exercises "control or authority with respect to any employee benefit fund" within the
meaning of "fiduciary" as defined by H.R. 1046, § 14(d). See text accompanying notes
10 1-02 supra.
129 Both bills expressly permit the fund to make loans to beneficiaries and participants of
the plan, when such loans are specifically provided for by the plan and are available on a
non-discriminatory basis. H.R. 1046, § 14(f)(5); S. 3589, § 14(c)(5). Such a provision
seems reasonable in light of the main purpose for which pension plans are established: to
provide for the welfare of employees.
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of trusts charges the trustee with the duty of making the trust res
productive of income.13 0 To perform this duty, the trustee is often
required to purchase and sell trust assets.13 1 This power of purchase and sale is generally implied from the duty to make the res
productive.' 3 2 Unfortunately, however, these general rules do not
answer the more difficult questions regarding the types of trust
assets which the trustee may purchase and sell, from whom these
assets may be purchased, and to whom they may be sold. Since
the applicable state's common and statutory law will generally
provide the answers to these questions in the context of private
trusts, state trust law could conceivably answer these questions
for private pension fund fiduciaries. However, at least in part,
both bills reject state trust law as a guide to the investment of
private pension fund assets.
Subject to two important limitations, both bills1 3 3 allow a pen-

sion fund to purchase any security 3 4 issued by an employer
whose employees are participants in the pension plan. Since in
many instances the employer is also the fiduciary, these provisions in effect expressly permit the pension fund fiduciary to
breach his duty of undivided loyalty. The draftsmen of the bills
created this exception to the duty of undivided loyalty for two
reasons. The first is based on the traditional practice of many
pension plans to invest fund assets in the employer's security,13 5 a
procedure which often benefits both the employer and the pension
fund.1 3 6 The second reason is that both bills have taken pains to
insure that the employer will be unable to take undue advantage
of such purchases. Both require that the purchase of the employ' 8 Furtherer's security13 7 be made for "adequate consideration. " 13
30
1

G. BOGERT, supra note 100, at § 702.

Private trust law is somewhat more restrictive with respect to the purchase and sale
of realty than this statement would indicate. Generally, the trustee may not purchase realty
for the trust. G. BOGERT, supra note 100, at § 678. Likewise if the trust contains realty at
its creation, courts are reluctant to imply a power of sale. A. ScoTT, LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 190, at 382 (abr. ed. 1960).
132 This implied power is, of course, subject to any express provisions to the contrary in
the trust instrument.
133 H.R. 1046, § 14(f)(4)(A); S. 3589, § 14(c)(4)(A).
13 4 The term "security," as used in both bills, is defined by the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77(a) et seq. (1964).
131 1970 House Hearings 912 (statement of the Council of Profit-Sharing Industries);
see also, 1970 House Hearings 850 (statement of Mr. Curtis).
136 1970 House Hearings850.
137 Both bills extend these requirements to the security of the immediate erpployer's
subsidiaries. S.3589, § 14(c)(4)(A); H.R. 1046, § 14(f)(4)(A). S. 3589 further applies these
requirements to the security of the immediate employer's parent company, S. 3589,
§ 14(c)(4)(A).
138 "Adequate consideration" is defined by both bills as either:
(1) the price of the security prevailing on a national securities exchange
which is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or
'1
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more, both bills limit the size of the purchase to a certain percentage of the fair market value of the fund's assets-ten percent

139
in the Senate version and twenty percent in the House bill.
Although these limitations have come under severe criticism from
numerous groups, 140 the tremendous stake involved-the security
of the pension fund-warrants these safeguards. Too often pension plans are terminated either because of the dissolution of the
employer's business or the employer's financial difficulties in general.14 1 If the plan has invested all or a substantial portion of its
assets in the employer's security, upon termination this security

(2) if the security is not traded on such a national securities exchange, at a
price not less favorable to the fund than the offering price for the
security as established by the current bid and asked prices quoted by
persons independent of the issuer.
H.R. 1046, § 14(f)(b); S. 3589, § 3(s).
139 H.R. 1046, § 14(f)(4)(A); S. 3589, § 14(c)(4)(A). Both bills expressly exempt from
these restrictions deferred profit-sharing, stock bonus, thrift, savings, and "other similar
plans which have the requirement that some or all of the plan funds shall be invested in
stock or securities of the employer." A 'thrift' plan is a plan which provides for the
contribution by the participants of a specified percentage of their salary. The employees'
contribution is then matched by the employer out of his profits. The employee need not
contribute, but if he does not, there will be no contribution by the employer. TAX
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, INC., TAX COORDINATOR
26,150A, at H-5209
(197 1). A 'savings' plan is similar to a thrift plan except that, while the employees may or
may not contribute to the plan, the employer must contribute a certain part of his profits.
Id. 26,150B, at H-52 10.
The justification for these exemptions is based upon the nature of these types of plans.
All four are geared to the employer's financial success and therefore have traditionally
invested their assets in the employer's security. 1970 House Hearings 912 (statement of
the Council of Profit-Sharing Industries). Nevertheless, there are countervailing considerations. First, there is no evidence that employers who establish these types of plans are
any less susceptible to financial difficulties than those who establish other types of plans.
Second, a close reading of both bills reveals that the federal prudent man rule does not
apply to the purchase by these plans of the employer's security. If the plan were jointly
administered, the union representatives might insist that the employer's security be a
sound investment. Such might not be the case with respect to those plans administered
solely by the employer. Although the INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 503(c)(6), (which prohibits any "substantial diversion" of the fund's corpus to the employer) and § 503(h) (which
provides that the fund's acquisition of any bond, debenture, note or other evidence of
indebtedness will not be treated as a loan without the receipt of adequate security if
immediately following the acquisition of the obligation not more than twenty-five percent
of the fund's assets are invested in such obligation of the employer) will have some
prophylactic effect on such investments, such limitations will be subject to the inadequacies of the Internal Revenue Code as a device for regulating private pension plans.
See text accompanying notes 29- 34 supra.
140 See, e.g., 1970 House Hearings 850 (remarks of Mr. Curtis); Hearingson H.R. 5741
Before the.General Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 169 (1968) (statement of Mr. Lane) [hereinafter cited as 1968 House
Hearings].
141From 1955 to 1965, 4,259 pension plans were terminated. Of these, 771 were
terminated as a result of the dissolution of the employer's business and another 1,087 were
terminated because of the employer's financial difficulties. Beier, Termination of Pension
Plans: 11 Years' Experience, 90 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 26 (1967). During this same

period, 3,655 deferred profit-sharing plans were terminated. Of these, 693 were terminated
because of the employer's financial difficulties and 732 were terminated because of the
dissolution of the employer's business. Beier, Profit-Sharingand Pension Plan Termination, 91 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 37 (1968).
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will be almost worthless, and the employees who qualify for

142
benefits under the plan will receive nothing when they retire.
On the other hand, if the plan has invested its assets in other
security, the employer's financial difficulties will have little effect

on its ability to pay retirement benefits. 143 Since one of the pur-

ported advantages of establishing a funded pension plan is to
insure that the employee's benefits are not totally dependent upon

the employer's financial success, the imposition of a ten or twenty
percent limitation on the fund's investment in the employer's
14 4
security would assist in achieving this desired end.
Unlike the House bill, the Senate bill further permits a plan
fiduciary to purchase any security from a party in interest, pro-

vided that the security is listed and traded on an exchange subject
to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, that no

brokerage commission, fee or other remuneration is paid in connection with the purchase, and that adequate consideration is
paid. 145 Thus, while permitting the purchase of any security from

a party in interest, the Senate bill takes steps to insure that such a
purchase is a fair transaction. By lim;ting purchasable securities to
those traded on an exchange (that is, an equity investment, bond,

or debenture), the bill provides a ready means to determine
whether the fiduciary paid adequate consideration for the secur142 Those who oppose the restrictions which the bills would place on investment in the
employer's security frequently argue that the prudent man rule will prevent this situation
from occurring. See, e.g., 1970 House Hearings 802 (statement of Mr. Lackman). The
problem with this argument is that while the investment may subsequently be adjudged
imprudent, it may be too late to help the plan participants. Although the fiduciary responsible for the imprudent investment can be held personally liable, (see text accompanying
notes 170- 80 infra), unless that fiduciary is a bank or other large institution, the fund may
be unable to recoup its losses.
143 Even in this case the size of the employee's benefit will depend in large part upon the
extent to which the plan is funded at the time of termination. If the plan has been in
existence for only a short time, it is unlikely that all past and present service liabilities will
have been funded.
144 During the course of the Hearings, several groups have made rather convincing
arguments to the effect that these limitations should only be applied to future investments.
As presently written, H.R. 1046, § 20, would require that pension funds meet these
limitations as of the date of the bill's enactment. S. 3589, § 15(d), provides that:
In order to provide for an orderly disposition of any investment, the
retention of which would be deemed to be prohibited by this Act, and in
order to protect the interest of the fund and its participants and its beneficiaries, the fiduciary may in his discretion effect the disposition of such
investment within three years after the date of enactment of this Act or
within such additional time as the Secretary may by rule or regulation allow,
and such action shall be deemed to be in compliance with this Act.
This provision seems to be the better of the two. Immediate compliance would require
those plans which have invested heavily in the employer's security to dispose of their
holdings forthwith, perhaps causing great loss to the fund, and to the employer's business.
145 S. 3589, § 14(c)(4)(B). If Congress were to enact H.R. 1046, the federal prudent man
rule might prohibit the fund's purchase of any security from a party in interest on the
ground that such a transaction breaches the duty of undivided loyalty. See G. BOGERT,
supra note 100, at § 543(T).
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ity. 146 Second, since no brokerage commission or fee is permitted
in connection with such transaction, the bill in effect requires the
fiduciary to purchase the security directly from the party in interest. 14 7 The draftsmen of the bill apparently decided that although security purchases from a party in interest should be
permitted, no added expenses in concluding such transactions
should be incurred by the fund.
Under the law of trusts, it is a breach of the trustee's duty of
undivided loyalty to sell trust property to himself, his relatives, or
other persons with whom he has a common financial interest.1 48
In certain circumstances both bills would undercut this duty by
allowing the pension fund fiduciary to sell securities to interested
parties. The House bill expressly permits a fiduciary to sell a
security held by the fund to the employer, the employee organization, or an officer, employee, agent, or other representative of
these two entities. However, the sale must be for no less than
adequate consideration. 149 Whether the bills should permit such
sales involves weighing two competing interests. On the one hand,
the ability of the fund to dispose of any security which it may hold
should not be unduly restricted. On the other hand, reform legislation should prevent any major conflicts of interest which might
subsequently injure the fund. When the fund purchases a security
from a party in interest, it can at least save itself brokerage
commissions and fees by purchasing directly from the issuer, and
can often make a very lucrative investment. But such considerations are not present with respect to the sale of a security,
because there is no brokerage commission that can be saved, and,
if the security represents a prudent investment, the fund should
have little difficulty in selling it to an outsider in an arm's length
transaction. A benefit could, therefore, only accrue to the party in
interest (most often a person who is familiar with the security
which the fund holds),1 50 thereby increasing the danger of loss to
the fund. Thus, by allowing sales to interested parties, a situation
146 "Adequate consideration" as used here would be limited to the price at which the
security is being traded on the exchange at the time of purchase.
147 For the most part, the party in interest referred to in this section will be a parent or
subsidiary
of the employer.
8
14 G. BOGERT, supra note 100, §§ 543(A), 543(T).
149 H.R. 1046, § 14(f)(4)(B). S. 3589, § 14(c)(4)(B), permits sales of a security to the
same persons and subject to the same restrictions as it permits purchases of security. That
is, a security may be sold to a party in interest if it is sold directly to that party, is listed on
a national exchange, and is sold for adequate consideration.
150 It is highly unlikely that most plan participants would have either sufficient resources
or sufficient knowledge of the security in the fund to take advantage of this provision.
Rather, it would most often be of benefit only to the employer, the employee organization,
or the officers of either entity.
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is created where a conflict of interest may arise and no benefit
may inure to the fund.
(c) Disposition of Pension Fund Assets upon Termination of
the Plan -Both bills require that every pension plan contain specific provision for the disposition of its assets upon termination.
When terminated, no part of the assets of the plan may be expended except for the exclusive benefit of plan participants and
their beneficiaries. However, after the satisfaction of all liabilities
under the plan,
in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and
the regulations promulgated thereunder, any remaining fund
assets may be returned to any person who has a legal or
equitable interest in such assets
by reason of having made
151
financial contribution thereto.
Essentially restating section 401(a)(7) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 15 2 the provision's purpose is to insure that termination does
not provide a windfall for the employer, at the expense of those
covered by the plan. 153 However, the provision's coverage is not
limited solely to those plans which seek qualified plan status
under the Internal Revenue Code.15 4 The provision is crucial,
particularly in situations involving discharge of employees caused
by merger, consolidation or plant shutdown. If the pension plan
continues as to any remaining employees, the weight of judicial
authority holds that a large-scale discharge of employees does not
in itself constitute termination of the plan. 15 5 In such a case, the
employer will gain a windfall insofar as the amount of the
151 H.R. 1046, § 14(i); S. 3589, § 14(f).
152

INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 401(a)(7) provides:

A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust... unless the plan of which
such trust is a part provides that, upon its termination or upon complete
discontinuance of contributions under the plan, the right of all employees to
benefits accrued to the date of termination or discontinuance, to the extent
then funded or the amounts credited to the employee's accounts, are nonforfeitable.
15 3
The plan may be terminated by the original employer or as the result of a conglomerate takeover. With respect to the problem of which fund assets may be returned to
"any person who has a legal or equitable interest in such assets," Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.401-2(b)(l), (2) (1964), make clear that the employer is only permitted to recover any
balance remaining in the fund which is a result of erroneous actuarial computations
occurring during the existence of the plan. The employer must first satisfy all fixed and
contingent liabilities owing to his employees.
154 The provision is, however, limited to those types of plans which are covered by the
fiduciary responsibility sections of the bills.
155 See, e.g., Gorr v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 253 Minn. 375, 91 N.W.2d 772 (1958),
in which 505 out of 580 employees were discharged; Bailey v. Rockwell Spring & Axle
Co., 13 Misc. 2d 29, 175 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1958), in which the employer had closed
one of its seventeen plants. Both cases are discussed in Levin, Proposals to Eliminate
Inequitable Loss of Pension Benefits, 15 VILL. L. REV. 527, 557-59 (1970).
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non-vested interests accruing to the discharged employees can be
applied against the employer's future contributions. If, however,
the courts were to consider the plan as terminated, then all accumulated pension credits in those who were employed at the
date of termination would vest immediately, irrespective of
whether the employees have met the plan's service and age re15
quirements. 6
By incorporating section 401(a)(7) of the Internal Revenue
Code into their provisions, both bills modify the common law
rule. Under section 401(a)(7), as under the common law rule,
once a plan is terminated all forfeitable (non-vested) rights and
interests become nonforfeitable. 15 7 However, the Income Tax
Regulations expressly state that the word "termination" is meant
to include both a partial and complete termination of the plan. 15 8
Thus, if a plan is deemed to have been partially terminated, 15 9 the
forfeitable interests of employees covered by that part of the plan
become nonforfeitable, and the employer would be precluded
from receiving a windfall from the large-scale discharge of his
employees.
(d) Miscellaneous Prohibitions of S. 3589-With a few minor
exceptions, the House bill permits all other pension fund transactions to be governed by the prudent man rule. The Senate bill,
however, contains several other specific prohibitions, two of
which merit brief consideration. Section 14(b)(2) prohibits a pension fund fiduciary from leasing or selling fund property to any
person known to be a party in interest and from leasing or purchasing for the fund any property known to belong to any party in
interest. Several persons, representing both employer and employee organizations, have severely criticized these provisions 16 0 on
the grounds that the prudent man rule provides an adequate
safeguard, and that such transactions can often be of benefit to the
fund. 16 1 Although S. 3589 permits a pension fund fiduciary to
purchase and sell securities listed on an exchange to a party in
15 6

See Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems and
Some
Proposals,76 HARV. L. REV. 952 (1963).
57
1 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(a) (1963).
158 Id. § 1.401- 6(b)(2).
159 Under Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(b)(2), whether or not a partial termination occurs will
be determined "on the basis of all the facts and circumstances."
160 See, e.g., 1968 House Hearings 187 (remarks of Mr. Biemiller), Id. at 60 (remarks of
Mr. Lumb); 1970 House Hearings 926 (statement of Owens-Illinois, Inc.). The predecessor of H.R. 1046, H.R. 5741, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), contained these prohibitions. They were subsequently removed by the bill's sponsor because of the severe
criticism they received during the 1968 House Hearings.
161 Private trust law generally prohibits the trustee from purchasing or selling realty.
Supra note 131.
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interest,16 2 the bill takes a different approach with respect to
transactions in real property for two reasons. First, the situation
may arise where the employer would contribute certain property
to the pension fund which would then lease it back to the employer for a minimum rental fee, a form of self-dealing that has
concerned the House Committee. 6 3 Second, whereas the value of
a security traded daily on a national exchange is easily determinable,' 6 4 it is difficult to ascertain the fair market value of realty.
Because there is no established market for land, its value can only
be estimated, and such approximations may vary considerably.
Although the prudent man rule does require adequate consideration for the sale or purchase of land, that requirement could
encompass the whole spectrum of estimated values. To meet the
literal demands of the prudent man rule, a pension fund fiduciary
could take advantage of this range of values to sell fund realty at
the lowest valuation. The consequent harm to the fund is obvious,
and the Senate bill's prohibition against the purchase, sale or lease
of pension fund realty to parties in interest seems, therefore, most
appropriate.
Section 14(c) of the Senate bill further provides that no
fiduciary responsibility provision should be construed to prohibit
any fiduciary from receiving reasonable compensation for his services or for the reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of his duties, provided, that no fiduciary who already
receives full-time pay from the employer or the employee organization may receive further compensation from the fund except
for the payment of expenses not otherwise reimbursed. 65 Certainly, the amount of work involved in the administration of a
pension fund and the threat of personal liability for mismanagement of that fund 166 justify reasonable compensation for a
fiduciary's services. 167 In light of these considerations, few employees will volunteer to become pension fund fiduciaries. It
would therefore seem that the intent of this provision is to encourage independent management of pension funds. Independent management has the advantage of being less susceptible to those
conflicts of interest that have caused such harm to pension funds
162 Section 14(c)(4)(B), discussed in the text accompanying notes 145- 50 supra.
183

1970 House Hearings 271 (statement of Mr. Bernstein).

14 S. 3589 requires that the security be traded on a national securities exchange before

it may be purchased from or sold to a party in interest. See text accompanying notes
145-50 supra.
'- H.R. 1046, § 14(f)(2), permits the pension fund fiduciary to receive "reasonable
compensation for services rendered," but does not contain the proviso.
166 See text accompanying notes 170-80 infra.
7
16 See comments of former Secretary of Labor Schultz, supra note 38.
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in the past 168 and provides greater competence in the field of fund
investment.
In conclusion, both proposals' provision for specific treatment
of fund investments has several advantages over the more general
approach of the prudent man rule. First, specificity enables the
pension fund fiduciary to know precisely which transactions are
permissible. Second, supervisors of the fiduciary's investment performance can more readily determine whether the investment is
prudent at the time the investment is made. Conversely, the
prudent man rule often involves a post facto determination of
prudence by the courts. In many cases by the time the court has
declared the investment imprudent, the loss to the fund is so great
that the fund's chances of recouping its losses are severely curtailed. This situation often occurs when the imprudent pension
fund fiduciary is an individual or small group of individuals as
opposed to a bank or other large institution. Despite these problems, many witnesses who testified during the course of the 1968
and 1970 House Hearings favored the use of the prudent man rule
69
in all pension fund transactions.'
B. PersonalLiability of the Pension Fund Fiduciary
While the common law of trusts provides several methods by
which a beneficiary can recover losses caused by the trustee's
mismanagement, 70 the most important remedy is the trustee's
personal liability in damages for the amount of loss incurred by
the trust. The purpose of imposing personal liability is to put the
beneficiary in the position he would have been, but for the wrong
committed by the trustee. 1 71 The law of trusts also holds the
trustee personally accountable for any gain he realizes through his
breach of trust. 172 Finally, a trustee may be held accountable for
any profit that would have accrued to the trust but for his mismanagement, even though the value of the trust's assets may not
have decreased '73
168 Professor Bernstein argues that only a public agency can insure neutral management
of pension funds since the pension industry is too employer-oriented to afford completely
neutral pension fund management. See 1970 House Hearings 27 1.
169 See note 160 supra.

170 E.g., with the exception of those cases involving a bona fide purchaser, the beneficiary may bring a bill in equity to void a conveyance of trust property when this
conveyance involves either a breach of the trustee's duty of loyalty or grossly inadequate
consideration. G. BOGERT, supra note 100, at § 861. The beneficiary may in certain cases
secure a court order requiring or prohibiting the trustee from engaging in a transaction
involving trust property. Id. at § 861. Both the Senate and House bills would permit the
Secretary of Labor to enjoin any acts which constitute or will constitute a violation of the
duties imposed on a fiduciary by their fiduciary responsibility sections. H.R. 1046,
§ 9(i)(l);
S. 3589, § 9(e)(3).
17 1
G. BOGERT, supra note 100, at § 701.
17 2
A. SCOTT, supra note 131, at § 205.
17 3
Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 (1953).
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Both bills have incorporated these common law rules into provisions imposing personal liability on any pension fund fiduciary
who breaches any of the responsibilities or duties imposed on
fiduciaries. 1 74 Of course, personal liability will often prove an
inadequate remedy, especially when the loss incurred by the fund
is large. 175 Nothing short of reinsurance can provide protection
against all pension fund losses.' 76 Nevertheless, since financial
ruin is a powerful deterrent, the threat of personal liability should
prove most effective in preventing breaches of fiduciary respon77
sibility.'

The personal liability provisions of the bills have been subject
to severe criticism during the Hearings.

78

Critics argue that these

provisions, imposing liability for unintentional violations of
fiduciary standards, are too severe. It has been suggested that the

fiduciary be held liable only when he acts with "wilful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard" of his
duties. 179 This suggestion is rather unpersuasive. Under the law of
trusts the trustee has always been held strictly liable for breaches
of trust,' 8 0 and this sanction has not proven unduly burdensome.
Most importantly, it would be extremely difficult to prove wilful
misfeasance, or reckless disregard. If this standard were adopted,
the effectiveness of personal liability as a deterrent would be
severely reduced.' 8 '
174 H.R. 1046, § 14(g). S. 3589, § 14(d). There may be some question as to whether or
not these provisions cover the case in which the breach of fiduciary responsibility results
only in the fund's failure to produce income. A proper construction of these provisions
would probably include lost profits within the meaning of "losses to the fund."
175 If the fiduciary who is responsible for the loss is a bank or an investment company,
the remedy of personal liability will be generally adequate.
176 Several bills have recently been introduced in Congress to provide for reinsurance of
private pension plans. See, e.g., H.R. 1045, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 2167, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
The bonding requirements of the current Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act,
incorporated in their identical form by these bills, are not intended to cover most losses
resulting from pension fund mismanagement, but are only directed against loss directly
caused by dishonesty or fraud. 29 U.S.C. § 308d(a) (1964); H.R. 1046, § 13(a); S. 3589,
§ 10.
177 Both bills permit either the Secretary of Labor or a participant or beneficiary of the
plan to institute a civil action to impose personal liability on the pension fund fiduciary.
H.R. 1046, § 9(i)(1); S. 3589, § 9(e)(2). Appropriately, when the participant or beneficiary
can meet the requirements for a proper class action, S. 3589 permits such an action to be
maintained. Both bills take pains, however, to prevent strike suits. S. 3589, § 9(h)(l)(B),
requires the plaintiff to post security for the payment of costs and attorney's fees. H.R.
1046, § 9(i)(2) provides that no action to recover damages for a breach of a fiduciary s duty
"shall be brought by a participant or beneficiary except upon leave of the court obtained
upon verified application and for good cause shown which application may be made ex
parte." Either approach seems reasonable.
178 See, e.g., 1968 House Hearings 61 (statement of Mr. Lumb); 1970 House Hearings
902 (statement of the American Retail Federation).
179 Committee or: Pension and Profit Sharing Trusts, supra note 86, at 27.
18 0 A. ScoTr, supra note 13 1, § 20 1.
is' Both bills provide that the fiduciary is not to be relieved from his responsibilities by
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C. ProhibitionsAgainst CertainPersons Holding Office
Both bills prohibit persons who have committed certain specified crimes 8 2 from holding office 183 in the pension plan. 18 4 Modeled on a similar provision in the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act, 1' this prohibition has two basic purposes.
The first is to reduce the likelihood of breaches of fiduciary
responsibility. The bills' draftsmen apparently believed that certain criminal acts are indicative of an inability to adhere to proper
standards of fiduciary responsibility. 1 86 In addition, this prohibition is designed to promote the policies of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 187 by preventing persons who have
an exculpatory clause in the agreement establishing the pension plan. S. 3589, § 14(g);
H.R. 1046, § 140). In the law of trusts, exculpatory clauses, although strictly construed,
are generally enforced unless they attempt to exonerate the trustee from breaches of trust
committed in bad faith or intentionally or with reckless indifference to the interests of the
beneficiaries. In the latter cases, such clauses are held void as against public policy. A.
ScOTT, supra note 131, at § 222.3.
182 H.R. 1046, § 15; S. 3589, § 15. The list of crimes in the two bills is somewhat
different. S. 3589, the more inclusive of the two bills, lists the following:
robbery, bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson,
violation of narcotics laws, murder, rape, kidnapping, perjury, assault with
intent to kill, assault which inflicts grievous bodily injury, any crime described in section 9(a)(l) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.
80a-9(a)(1) ), or a violation of any provision of this Act, or a violation of
section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 157,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. 186), or a violation of chapter 63 of title 18, United
States Code, or a violation of section 874, 1027, 1503, 1505, 1506, 1510,
195 1 or 1954 of title 18, United States Code, or a violation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (73 Stat. 519, as
amended; 29 U.S.C. 401), or conspiracy to commit any such crimes or
attempt to commit any such crimes, or a crime in which any of the foregoing
is an element ....
The list of crimes in the House bill is limited to crimes involving fraudulent financial
practices.
183 Specifically, one is prohibited from serving as an administrator, officer, trustee,
custodian, counsel, agent, employee (excepting, under S. 3589, an employee performing
exclusively clerical or janitorial duties), or consultant of any pension plan. H.R. 1046,
§ 15(a); S. 3589, § 15(a).
184 Violation of these provisions is punishable by a fine of not more than ten thousand
dollars and/or imprisonment for not more than one year. H.R. 1046, § 15(b); S. 3589,
§ 15(b). Note, however, that in addition to authorizing a criminal action under this section,
both bills give the Secretary and a plan participant or beneficiary standing to bring an
action to merely remove such person from office. S. 3589, § 9(e)(2); H.R. 1046, §9(i)(2).
See text accompanying note 233 infra.
18 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1964).

186The prohibitions are not, however, absolute. Both bills provide that a person may not
assume a position in the pension plan only
during or for five years after such conviction or after the end of such
imprisonment, unless prior to the end of such five-year period, in the case of
a person so convicted or imprisoned, (A) his citizenship rights, having been
revoked as a result of such conviction, have been fully restored, or (B) the
Board of Parole of the United States Department of Justice determines that
such person's service in any capacity [on behalf of the fund] would not be
contrary to the purposes of this Act.
S.3589, § 15(a); H.R. 1046, § 15(a).
187 1970 House Hearings 469 (statement of former Secretary of Labor Schultz).
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been barred froin holding union office from securing alternative
188
employment in the service of the union's pension plan.
D. Modified Disclosure Requirements- The Annual Report
Although Congress originally thought that adequate disclosure
of pension fund transactions would help prevent breaches of
fiduciary responsibility, the categorical approach of the disclosure
provisions of the current Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act has been of little assistance in this regard.'8 9 For example,
under the current Act, with the exception of certain party-in-interest transactions, the pension fund administrator need
only disclose the aggregate amounts received and expended for
the sale and purchase of fund assets.' 9 0 Gains or losses resulting
from such sales are likewise reported in the aggregate, according
to the category of assets sold.' 9 ' This data does little to aid in the
determination of whether or not a particular investment is prudent. 192 In order to facilitate enforcement of their standards of
fiduciary responsibility, both bills require more specific disclosure
of pension fund transactions. 93 Yet, several flaws remain which
may seriously hinder the effectiveness of the fiduciary responsibility standards.
1. The Purchase and Sale of Fund Securities- With respect to
the purchase and sale of fund securities in general, both bills
perpetuate the inadequacies of the disclosure provisions of the
current Act. 19 4 The House bill' 9 5 requires a statement of aggregate purchases, sales, redemptions, and exchanges of investment
securities (including bonds and debentures), identified by type of
security.' 9 6 In the case of purchases, the fund administrator must
188 Most witnesses testifying before the House General Subcommittee on Labor approved the inclusion of these prohibitions in the bills. Indeed, many argued for more
stringent bans. See, e.g., 1968 House Hearings 172 (statement of Mr. Lane); Id. at 223

(statement of Mr. Bronston).
189 See text accompanying notes 50-57 supra.
19029 U.S.C. § 306(b) (1964). See also EMPLOYEE WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT
PLAN
ANNUAL REPORT, FORM D-2, pt. IV, in 1968 House Hearings 79-82.
91

1 See EMPLOYEE WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLAN
note 190, pt. IV, § c, Schedule 2, in 1968 House Hearings 82.

ANNUAL REPORT,

supra

192 1968 House Hearings 55.

193 It should be noted here that both bills broaden the coverage of the disclosure
provisions. The current Act requires every administrator whose plan is subject to the Act
and covers one hundred or more participants, to file an annual report. 29 U.S.C. § 306
(1964). H.R. 1046, § 7(a), and S. 3589, § 7(a), require an annual report of all plans subject
to the fiduciary responsibility provisions of the bills or, irrespective of whether or not they
are subject to those provisions, of all plans subject to the Act in general which cover one
hundred or more participants.
194S. 3589, § 7(b)(2)(A); H.R. 1046, § 7(f)(l)(D).

193 This section only applies to plans which are "funded through the medium of a trust."
For a discussion of the possible problems arising from this phraseology, see supra note
106.

196 E.g., Common stock, bond issues.
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disclose the aggregate purchase price; in the case of sales, redemptions, or exchanges, he must disclose the aggregate cost,
proceeds, and the net gain or loss. Such information would not
reveal most instances of imprudent investments and would, in
effect, permit the pension fund fiduciary to offset his gains against
his losses.

19 7

There are basically two arguments against requiring more detailed disclosure. One contention is that detailed information with
respect to the purchase and sale of fund securities should remain
confidential. Some critics fear that detailed disclosure would generate pressure on pension fund fiduciaries to maximize short-term
investment results, perhaps at the expense of the fund's security,
and that disclosure of purchases and sales of fund investments
might be improperly construed as an expression of lack of confidence in a particular company. 198 It is further asserted that
detailed disclosure would impose too burdensome a workload on
pension fund fiduciaries. 199 Although more detailed disclosure
would undoubtedly increase the fiduciary's administrative workload, the bills could meet the confidentiality argument by requiring
that the more detailed aspects of the annual report be kept confidential to everyone except the Secretary of Labor and, upon
written request, the plan participants and their beneficiaries.
Otherwise, inadequate disclosure would surely undermine the
effectiveness of the bills' standards of fiduciary responsibility.
The Senate bill strikes a compromise between these demands
by requiring the disclosure of the aggregate cost and value of each
security, by issuer, held by the pension fund at the end of the
year. 20 0 The pension fund fiduciary must also disclose the aggregate amount, by type of security, of all purchases, sales, redemptions and exchanges of securities made during the year and a list
of the issuers of those securities. 20 1 Disclosure of the cost and
value of each security will enable the Secretary of Labor or plan
participant to examine the performance record of each security.
Nevertheless, the Senate bill would still permit the pension fund
fiduciary to conceal a portion of his losses. Since the fiduciary
need only list those securities held by the fund at the end of the
year, the annual report would not reveal the prudence of an
investment in a security which is purchased and sold entirely
197 Under trust law the trustee is generally not permitted to offset his gains against his
losses. G. BOGERT, supra note 100, at § 708.
98

1 See, e.g., 1970 House Hearings 813- 14 (statement of Mr. Tyson).
199 See, e.g., 1970 House Hearings 799 (statement of Mr. Lackman).
200
201

S. 3589, § 7(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 7(b)(3).
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within the reporting year.2 0 2 However, since the bill also requires
a statement of the aggregate amount of all purchases and sales
made during the year and a list of the issuers of those securities,
the Secretary would at least be aware of such transactions. If he
has cause to suspect any misdealing, the Senate bill authorizes the
Secretary to secure additional information pursuant to his investigatory powers.2 0 3 The Senate bill therefore shifts much of the
administrative burden from the fund fiduciary to the Secretary.
Nevertheless, these provisions are an improvement over the similar provisions of the House bill.
Both bills require more detailed disclosure of purchases and
sales of fund securities issued by the employer or other party in
interest. Each proposal requires that the annual report separately
identify every transaction and list, including the type of security,
its cost and current value, the purchase or selling price, the net
gain or loss on each sale, and the identity of the issuer.2 0 4 In
addition, the report must include a detailed list of all transactions
in securities held or owned by the employer, employee organization, or party in interest. This list must contain information
with respect to the type of security involved, its cost, the expenses connected with the purchase or sale, the proceeds on that
sale, the net gain or loss, and the identity of the other party and
his relationship to the plan. 20 5 This data should be sufficient to
reveal most breaches of fiduciary responsibility. The principal
reason for the detailed disclosure of party-in-interest transactions
is that most breaches occur when the fiduciary is faced with
conflicting interests.
2. The Purchaseand Sale of Other FundAssets-With respect
to the purchase and sale of other fund assets in general, both bills
require that the annual report include: a statement of aggregate
purchases, sales, or exchanges, identified by type of asset; the
aggregate purchase or selling price; the aggregate expenses incurred in connection with such purchase or sale; the aggregate
cost of the asset and its proceeds; and the aggregate net gain or
loss.2 0 6 The Senate bill further requires that the annual report
separately identify each transaction involving over $100,000 or
202 This is one of the inadequacies of the disclosure provisions of the current Act. 1968
House Hearings 55 (statement of Mr. Donahue).
203 S. 3589, § 9(c) provides in part: "The secretary shall have power... to make an
investigation and in connection therewith he may require the filing of supporting schedules
of... financial information .... " The House bill contains a comparable provision. H.R.
1046, § 7(b).
204 H.R. 1046, § 7(f)(l)(C); S. 3589, §8 7(b)(2)(B)(ii), 7(b)(3).
205 H.R. 1046, § 7(f)(1)(C); S. 3589, § 7(b)(7).
20- H.R. 1046, § 7(f)(l)(E); S. 3589, § 7(b)(4)(A).
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three percent of the fund's value, and include with respect to such
transaction the type of asset, the purchase or selling price, the
expenses incurred in connection with the purchase or sale, the
cost of the asset, the net gain or loss on each sale, and the identity
of the purchaser or seller. 20 7 Again, by requiring only aggregate
disclosure, the draftsmen have over-reacted to the increased administrative burdens that more detailed disclosure would impose
upon the pension fund fiduciary. Since transactions in assets other
than securities (primarily fixed assets such as land and buildings)
are unlikely to occur very frequently, the administrative burden
argument is not compelling. Furthermore, full disclosure is especially important when the asset lacks an established market value
as in the case of most assets other than securities. Without full
disclosure of the details of such transactions, it will be impossible,
absent subsequent investigation, 20 8 to determine the prudence of
any particular investment. Finally, it is difficult to argue that such
transactions should remain confidential. With fixed assets, there is
little danger that full disclosure will affect investor confidence or
encourage the fund fiduciary to sacrifice the fund's security in
order to maximize short-term investment results. 20 9 For these
reasons the annual report should at least fully disclose all pension
fund transactions in assets other than securities.
With respect to the purchase and sale of assets other than
securities to parties in interest, both bills again require more
detailed information. The pension fund fiduciary must include in
his report a detailed list of all such purchases, sales, and exchanges, the asset involved, the purchase or selling price, expenses incurred in connection with the transaction, the cost of the
asset, the net gain or loss on sale, and the identity of the seller or
purchaser and his relationship to the plan. 21 0 These disclosure
requirements are sufficiently detailed to assist enforcement of the
fiduciary responsibility sections of both proposals.
3. Loans-As discussed earlier, the power of pension fund
fiduciaries to loan pension fund assets has been subject to great
abuse, and the current Act has been relatively ineffective irf preventing such abuses. 2 11 Both proposed laws would prohibit loans
to parties in interest and subject all other loans to the scrutiny of
the prudent man rule.2 12 In order to enforce these provisions
effectively, the bills must contain adequate disclosure provisions.
S. 3589, § 7(b)(4)(B).
See text accompanying notes 222- 31 infra.
See text accompanying note 198 supra.
210 H.R. 1046, § 7(f)(1)(C); S. 3589, § 7(b)(7).
211 See notes 37-40 supra.
212
See text accompanying notes 125-29 supra.
207
208
209
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The House bill requires that the annual report contain a detailed list of all loans made by the pension fund during the year
and all loans outstanding at the end of the year, including information as to the identity and address of the debtors, the dates
on which the loans were made, their maturity dates, the interest
rate, the face amount of the loan, the amount outstanding at the
end of the year, the type and value of collateral held, and any
other terms and conditions. 2 13 Loans made to the employer, the
employee organization, or other parties in interest must be separately identified. 214 Thus, the House bill requires precisely the
type of disclosure needed to determine whether each loan is
adequately secured and provides a sufficient rate of return to be a
prudent investment.
Unfortunately, the Senate bill takes a less thorough approach.
In general, it requires the fiduciary to make a schedule of principal
and interest payments received during the year, aggregated by
type of loan. More detailed disclosure is only required when a
loan is made to a party in interest, is in default, is written off
during the year as uncollectable, or exceeds $100,000 or three
percent of the fund's value. 2 15 Perhaps the considerations of the
great administrative burden which would otherwise be imposed
upon the pension fund fiduciary 2 16 underlie the limited disclosure
provisions with respect to loans. However, in order to determine
whether a particular loan meets a minimum test of prudence, at
least the collateral and interest rate of that loan should be disclosed. Limiting detailed disclosure to loans exceeding $100,000
or three percent of the fund's value will probably permit con21 7
cealment of improper loans of lesser amounts.
In general, both bills require significantly more detailed disclosure than the current Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
213

H.R. 1046, § 7(f)(1)(F). Under this section, Veterans' Administration, 38 U.S.C.
1801 et seq. (1964), and Federal Housing Administration insured mortgage loans, 12
U.S.C. § 1709 (1964), mortgages on single-unit residences which are purchased on a block
basis from banks or similar institutions, and loans made to plan participants on a
non-discriminatory basis need only be reported by the total amount of each category of
loan outstanding at the end of the reporting year.
214 H.R. 1046, § 14(e), prohibits loans to all parties in interest. This disclosure requirement is not, however, designed solely to entrap unwary plan fiduciaries. These disclosure
requirements do apply to certain plans not subject to § 14. A similar provision is contained
in S. 3589, § 4(a).
215 S. 3589, § 7(b)(5).
21 6
See~text accompanying note 199 supra.
217 E.g., a union-administered fund with assets totaling four million dollars makes an
unsecured loan of ninety-five thousand dollars to X company. The lack of proper security
would only be reported if the loan was in default or was written off as uncollectable (an
unlikely prospect). If the party responsible for this imprudent investment were an individual, subsequent recovery of this ninety-five thousand dollars might prove difficult, if
not impossible.
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Act.2 18 Nevertheless, whether the proposals provide effective disclosure is open to serious doubt.
E. Enforcement
The original Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act relied
exclusively on pension plan participants and beneficiaries for its
enforcement. The Secretary of Labor was to be "a mere repository" of information reported under the Act.2 19 In 1962, Congress
sought to strengthen the original Act with amendments giving the
Secretary certain investigatory powers. Under the current Act the
Secretary may, "when he continues to have reasonable cause to
believe investigation may disclose violations" of the Act, make
any investigation that he deems necessary. 22 0 He is also authorized to seek, in his discretion, a permanent or temporary injunction to restrain any acts or practices that violate the provi2 21
sions of the Act.
In order to facilitate enforcement of fiduciary responsibility
standards and prohibitions against certain persons holding office
in the pension fund, H.R. 1046 and S. 3589 would liberalize the
Secretary's investigatory powers and grant both the Secretary and
pension plan participants and beneficiaries further power to enforce the provisions of the Act through legal action.
With respect to the investigatory powers of the Secretary, the
Senate bill provides the more liberal grant of power. Section 9(c)
provides, in part:

218 S. 3589 requires the pension fund administrator to disclose certain other information
which need not be disclosed under H.R. 1046. First, § 7(b)(6) requires the administrator to
list all leases of property with persons other than parties in interest who are in default on
their lease and all leases with parties in interest. Information with respect to the terms of
the lease, the nature of the property leased, the identity of the lessor or lessee, his
relationship to the plan, etc., must be disclosed. S. 3589, § 14(b)(2)(A), and (B), prohibit a
fiduciary from leasing fund property to any known party in interest or leasing on behalf of
the fund any property known to be property of any party in interest. In addition, S. 3589
requires the disclosure of certain information which, although of little relevance to the
purposes of the bill, is designed to provide Congress and the public with a better understanding of the current state of the private pension plan system. For example, § 7(0(7)
would require the pension fund fiduciary to include in the annual report a statement
showing the number of participants who terminated service under the plan
during the year, whether or not they retain any non-forfeitable rights, their
length of service by category, the present value of the total accrued benefits
of said participants and the present value of such benefits forfeited ....
Several witnesses before the House General Subcommittee on Labor-h-ave severely
criticized these provisions as being both of little value and overly burdensome on plan
fiduciaries. See, e.g., 1970 House Hearings "71-72 (statement of Mr. Bassett); Id. at 926
(statement
of Owens-Illinois, Inc.).
21 9
H.R. REP. No. 998, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961).
220 29 U.S.C. § 308(d) (1964).
221 Id. § 308(f).
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The Secretary shall have power, when he believes it necessary in order to determine whether any person has violated or
is about to violate any provisions of this Act, to make an
investigation and in connection therewith he may require the
filing of supporting schedules of the financial information required to be furnished under [the annual report section] and
may enter such places, inspect such records and accounts,
and question such persons as he may deem necessary to
enable him to determine the facts relative to such investigation.

This provision, based on section 601-of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,222 gives the Secretary
almost unrestricted investigatory powers. 22 3 The House bill applies a more restrictive standard, requiring, as a condition precedent to investigation, that the Secretary have "reasonable cause to
believe investigation may disclose violations of this act." 22 4 However, the House bill further provides that notwithstanding the
reasonable cause standard, the Secretary
may cause periodic examinations to be made of any...
pension benefit plan subject to [the fiduciary responsibility
section of the bill]: Provided, however, That no such exam225
ination shall be made more often than once a year.

Although the examinations are limited to one per year, this provision most certainly lessens the effectiveness of the reasonable
22 6
cause limitation.
These provisions have been subject to criticism on the ground
that they authorize the Secretary to engage in "fishing expeditions, ' 22 7 and will lead to undue interference with the management of the plan. 2 28 It is doubtful, however, that the Secretary
U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1964).
223See, e.g., Wirtz v. Local 191, Teamsters, 218 F. Supp. 885, 887 (D.C. Conn. 1963),
affd 321 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), interpreting the identical grant of investigatory power under
§ 521 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act.
224 H.R. 1046, § 9(d).
225 Id.
2 It should be noted that both bills make applicable to the investigatory powers of the
Secretary the provisions of§§ 9 and 10 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
88 49, 50 (1964). Section 9 gives the Secretary power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence as
relates to the matter under investigation. Section 10 provides that certain penalties be
imposed on those persons who neglect or refuse to attend and testify, fail to produce
documentary evidence, or willfully mutilate or otherwise falsify documentary evidence.
227See, e.g., 1970 House Hearings I I I (remarks of Mr. Biemiller); Id. at 295 (statement
of Mr. Lumb).
228 See, e.g., 1970 House Hearings III (remarks of Mr. Biemiller). One witness went so
far as to argue that such provisions violate the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. 1968 House Hearings 161 (statement of Mr. Lane). To placate
the fears of these critics, both bills retain, in substance, § 308(h) of the current Act, which
222 28
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has either the time or resources to engage in "fishing expeditions." 22 9 Moreover, if the Secretary were to engage in such
expeditions, it is within the power of the federal district courts to
23 0
impose protective restraints on the conduct of his investigation.
Finally, if the bills required detailed disclosure, an investigation
conditioned solely upon reasonable cause would be sufficient. The
Secretary would have sufficient information to determine whether
or not each transaction was prudent or otherwise not prohibited
by the Act. However, since the bills rely, for the most part, on
categorical and aggregate disclosure, it may be necessary for the
Secretary to conduct an investigation into a particular fund's
investment policies before he can determine whether the fund is
being managed prudently 231
In addition to the rights of action which the current Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act provides, both bills permit
either the Secretary or any pension plan participant or beneficiary
to bring a civil action 23 2 for appropriate relief, legal or equitable,
when a fiduciary has breached a responsibility or duty imposed by
the fiduciary responsibility sections. Actions may also be brought
to remove any fiduciary who has failed to fulfill his required duties
or who is occupying a position with the fund which the Act
prohibits him from holding. 23 3 The House bill further permits the
Secretary or any plan participant or beneficiary to seek an order
enjoining any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute
a violation of fiduciary standards; 23 4 the Senate bill gives this
23 5
power solely to the Secretary.
These provisions should be more than sufficient to enforce the
bills' substantive provisions. However, pension plan participants
have traditionally been rather inactive in supervising the operation
of their pension plan. There may be several reasons for this
inactivity: too often workers assume that their union always acts
provides that "nothing contained in this chapter shall be so construed or applied as to
authorize the Secretary to regulare, or interfere in the management of, any employee ...pension benefit plan...." H.R. 1046, § 9(h); S. 3589, § 90).
229 See 1970 House Hearings 490 (remarks of former Secretary of Labor Schultz).
23 0
See Goldberg v. Truck Drivers Local 299, 293 F.2d 807, 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 938 (1961), a case involving § 601 of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act.
21 The ability of the Secretary to conduct such investigations will, however, be dependent upon a substantial increase in the Labor Department's manpower and financial
resources. Supra note 229.
232 S. 3589, § 9(e)(2), expressly permits a participant or beneficiary to bring suit "as a
representative party on behalf of all participants or beneficiaries similarly situated where
the requirements for maintaining a class action are met."
3 H.R. 1046, § 9(i)(2); S.3589, § 9(e)(2).
234 H.R. 1046, §§ 9(i)(1), (f).
235 S.3589, § 9(e)(3).
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in their best interest; many lack sufficient financial resources to
pursue a lawsuit against the fund administrators; many pension
plan participants are not assured of any vested interest in a
pension until they actually retire; perhaps many feel that the
amount of benefits that they will actually receive is too insignificant to merit legal action; or perhaps they are inadequately
informed as to the nature of their pension plan. These bills, like
the current Act, may rely too extensively on plan participants and
their beneficiaries. 2 3 6 In any event, the shadow of inadequate
disclosure casts doubt upon the effectiveness of the enforcement

provisions of the two bills. In the absence of constant supervision
by the Secretary of Labor, only the most flagrant abuses will be
discovered.
VI. CONCLUSION

The American private pension plan system is designed, in part,
as a response to the need to alleviate the penury and sense of
helplessness which many citizens face upon retirement. Unfortunately, private pensions have not proven to be a complete solution
to these problems. Many workers are still not covered by a
private pension plan; and many of those covered find themselves
deprived of a pension at the last moment, either because they fail
to meet the plan's service or age requirements,2 3 7 because the
employer suddenly terminates the plan, or because the plan has
been improperly managed and is without sufficient funds to meet
the benefit demands of retiring employees.
Although H.R. 1046 and S. 3589 attempt to remedy some of
the ills of private pension plans, they have many weaknesses.
Their lists of prohibited transactions are not sufficiently inclusive,

236 Another potential problem of relying on enforcement by plan participants and beneficiaries is that the union and/or employer may assert great pressure on any of these
persons who contemplate bringing an action against the fund fiduciary, especially if that
fiduciary happens also to be an official of the employer or the union. In this connection it is
interesting to note that the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 464(a) (1964), provides that the
Secretary, upon written complaint of a union member, shall investigate the complaint and
if he finds probable cause that a violation of the Act has occurred, shall bring a civil action
without disclosing the identity of the complainant. This provision was undoubtedly intended to insulate union members from any pressures that might be forthcoming from the
union and to encourage reports of violations. Although not expressly authorized by either
H.R. 1046 or S. 3589, neither bill prohibits the Secretary from following such procedures.
2 7
Several bills were introduced in the 91st Congress that would specifically deal with
this problem. They would, inter alia, establish minimum standards for the funding of
pension plans and the vesting of pension plan benefits. S. 2167, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); H.R. 1045, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). For a discussion of these proposals, see
Levin, Proposals to Eliminate Inequitable Loss of Pension Benefits, 15 VILL. L. REV.
527, 580-84 (1970).
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their disclosure provisions are in several respects inadequate, and
consequently their enforcement provisions will not be fully
effective. Legislative compromise is apt to weaken them further.
Nevertheless, because these proposals would prevent many of the
more flagrant abuses, they should assist in the much needed
reform of the private pension system.
-Stephen E. Dawson

